HCL Technologies Limited Legacy Interactive Voice Response (IVR)
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cpe:2.3:h:hcltech:legacy_ivr:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
part: h version: - update: *
| Vendor | Hcltech (be2dce80-cb79-5854-9fe6-9b4a1139ec3e) |
|---|---|
| Product | Legacy Ivr (f57fbbbb-2ff1-5a7d-9a4b-e593d64c07ee) |
| Edition | * |
| Language | * |
| Software edition | * |
| Target software | * |
| Target hardware | * |
| Other | * |
| Notes | Imported from NVD CPE 2.0 feed |
PURL mappings
| PURL | Source | Last updated |
|---|---|---|
| No PURL mappings for this CPE yet. | ||
Vulnerability references
| Identifier | cpeApplicability | Submitted | db.gcve.eu details | Rationale |
|---|---|---|---|---|
CVE:CVE-2018-11518 |
not_vulnerable | 2026-06-03 14:38:01.632768 |
Details available
A vulnerability allows a phreaking attack on HCL legacy IVR systems that do not use VoIP. These IVR systems rely on various frequencies of audio signals; based on the frequency, certain commands and functions are processed. Since these frequencies are accepted within a phone call, an attacker can record these frequencies and use them for service activations. This is a request-forgery issue when the required series of DTMF signals for a service activation is predictable (e.g., the IVR system does not speak a nonce to the caller). In this case, the IVR system accepts an activation request from a less-secure channel (any loudspeaker in the caller's physical environment) without verifying that the request was intended (it matches a nonce sent over a more-secure channel to the caller's earpiece).
Published: 2018-05-30T20:00:00.000Z
Updated: 2024-08-05T08:10:14.610Z |
Imported from gcve-enriched-dumps CVE data |
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