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cpe:2.3:a:pi-hole:ftldns:6.6:*:*:*:*:*:*:*

part: a version: 6.6 update: *

VendorPi Hole (525d0520-023b-5ac7-adae-b0bb743ce667)
ProductFtldns (d3b8cbaa-6720-5b32-8da6-d87b00060f96)
Edition*
Language*
Software edition*
Target software*
Target hardware*
Other*
NotesImported from NVD CPE 2.0 feed

PURL mappings

PURLSourceLast updated
pkg:github/pi-hole/ftl purl2cpe 2026-06-01 10:10:56.970907

Vulnerability references

IdentifiercpeApplicabilitySubmitteddb.gcve.eu detailsRationale
CVE:CVE-2026-39849 vulnerable 2026-06-08 08:01:17.105036 Pi-hole FTL remote code execution via newline injection in dns.interface configuration
Pi-hole FTL is the core engine of the Pi-hole network-level advertisement and tracker blocker. In versions before 6.6.1, the `dns.interface` configuration field in Pi-hole FTL accepted newline characters without validation, allowing an attacker to inject arbitrary directives into the generated dnsmasq configuration file. On installations with no admin password set (the default for many deployments), the configuration API is fully accessible without credentials, allowing a network-adjacent attacker to inject the payload, enable the built-in DHCP server, and achieve arbitrary command execution on the host the next time any device on the network requests a DHCP lease. The injected value is persisted to /etc/pihole/pihole.toml and survives restarts. The strncpy in the code path limits the total interface field to 31 bytes, but payloads such as wlan0\ndhcp-script=/tmp/p fit within this constraint. The dnsmasq config validation introduced in FTL 6.6 only checks syntactic validity, so valid directives injected via newline pass validation successfully. This issue has been fixed in version 6.6.1.
Published: 2026-05-05T20:50:26.021Z
Updated: 2026-05-08T14:12:44.566Z
Reference links
Imported from gcve-enriched-dumps CVE data

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