Opensatkit

An issue was discovered in OpenSatKit 2.2.1. The EventErrStr buffer has a fixed size of 256 bytes. The code uses sprintf to format two filenames (Source1Filename and the string returned by FileUtil_FileStateStr) into this buffer without any length checking and without using bounded format specifiers such as %.*s. If the filename length approaches OS_MAX_PATH_LEN (commonly 64-256 bytes), the combined formatted string together with constant text can exceed 256 bytes, resulting in a stack buffer overflow. Such unsafe sprintf calls are scattered across multiple functions in file.c, including FILE_ConcatenateCmd() and ConcatenateFiles(), all of which fail to validate the output length.

Published: 2026-02-11T00:00:00.000Z
Updated: 2026-02-12T15:02:00.414Z

Directory traversal vulnerability in OpenSatKit 2.2.1 allows attackers to gain access to sensitive information or delete arbitrary files via crafted value to the FileUtil_GetFileInfo function.

Published: 2026-02-11T00:00:00.000Z
Updated: 2026-02-12T14:58:06.498Z

An issue was discovered in OpenSatKit 2.2.1. The DirName field in the telecommand is provided by the ground segment and must be treated as untrusted input. The program copies DirName into the local buffer DirWithSep using strcpy. The size of this buffer is OS_MAX_PATH_LEN. If the length of DirName is greater than or equal to OS_MAX_PATH_LEN, a stack buffer overflow occurs, overwriting adjacent stack memory. The path length check (FileUtil_AppendPathSep) is performed after the strcpy operation, meaning the validation occurs too late and cannot prevent the overflow.

Published: 2026-02-11T00:00:00.000Z
Updated: 2026-02-12T14:55:55.149Z