Sudo

In Sudo through 1.8.29, the fact that a user has been blocked (e.g., by using the ! character in the shadow file instead of a password hash) is not considered, allowing an attacker (who has access to a Runas ALL sudoer account) to impersonate any blocked user. NOTE: The software maintainer believes that this CVE is not valid. Disabling local password authentication for a user is not the same as disabling all access to that user--the user may still be able to login via other means (ssh key, kerberos, etc). Both the Linux shadow(5) and passwd(1) manuals are clear on this. Indeed it is a valid use case to have local accounts that are _only_ accessible via sudo and that cannot be logged into with a password. Sudo 1.8.30 added an optional setting to check the _shell_ of the target user (not the encrypted password!) against the contents of /etc/shells but that is not the same thing as preventing access to users with an invalid password hash

Published: 2019-12-19T20:35:02.000Z
Updated: 2024-08-05T02:09:39.475Z

In Sudo through 1.8.29, an attacker with access to a Runas ALL sudoer account can impersonate a nonexistent user by invoking sudo with a numeric uid that is not associated with any user. NOTE: The software maintainer believes that this is not a vulnerability because running a command via sudo as a user not present in the local password database is an intentional feature. Because this behavior surprised some users, sudo 1.8.30 introduced an option to enable/disable this behavior with the default being disabled. However, this does not change the fact that sudo was behaving as intended, and as documented, in earlier versions

Published: 2019-12-19T20:37:09.000Z
Updated: 2024-08-05T02:09:39.576Z