Approved changes feed: RSS · Atom
cpe:2.3:a:openpgpjs:openpgpjs:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*part: a version: * update: *
| Vendor | Openpgpjs (54d6b2d3-f420-5f13-83f8-83f6e03550d5) |
|---|---|
| Product | Openpgpjs (ade932cb-f5e4-542e-9fb1-0ae214dee8b6) |
| Edition | * |
| Language | * |
| Software edition | * |
| Target software | * |
| Target hardware | * |
| Other | * |
Notes
Imported from purl2cpe mapping
PURL mappings
| PURL | Source | Last updated |
|---|---|---|
pkg:github/openpgpjs/openpgpjs |
purl2cpe | 2026-06-01 10:13:41.669580 |
pkg:maven/org.webjars.bowergithub.openpgpjs/openpgpjs |
purl2cpe | 2026-06-01 10:13:41.669582 |
Vulnerability references
| Identifier | cpeApplicability | Submitted | db.gcve.eu details | Rationale |
|---|---|---|---|---|
CVE:CVE-2025-47934 |
vulnerable | 2026-06-08 07:27:15.089160 |
OpenPGP.js's message signature verification can be spoofed
OpenPGP.js is a JavaScript implementation of the OpenPGP protocol. Startinf in version 5.0.1 and prior to versions 5.11.3 and 6.1.1, a maliciously modified message can be passed to either `openpgp.verify` or `openpgp.decrypt`, causing these functions to return a valid signature verification result while returning data that was not actually signed. This flaw allows signature verifications of inline (non-detached) signed messages (using `openpgp.verify`) and signed-and-encrypted messages (using `openpgp.decrypt` with `verificationKeys`) to be spoofed, since both functions return extracted data that may not match the data that was originally signed. Detached signature verifications are not affected, as no signed data is returned in that case. In order to spoof a message, the attacker needs a single valid message signature (inline or detached) as well as the plaintext data that was legitimately signed, and can then construct an inline-signed message or signed-and-encrypted message with any data of the attacker's choice, which will appear as legitimately signed by affected versions of OpenPGP.js. In other words, any inline-signed message can be modified to return any other data (while still indicating that the signature was valid), and the same is true for signed+encrypted messages if the attacker can obtain a valid signature and encrypt a new message (of the attacker's choice) together with that signature. The issue has been patched in versions 5.11.3 and 6.1.1. Some workarounds are available. When verifying inline-signed messages, extract the message and signature(s) from the message returned by `openpgp.readMessage`, and verify the(/each) signature as a detached signature by passing the signature and a new message containing only the data (created using `openpgp.createMessage`) to `openpgp.verify`. When decrypting and verifying signed+encrypted messages, decrypt and verify the message in two steps, by first calling `openpgp.decrypt` without `verificationKeys`, and then passing the returned signature(s) and a new message containing the decrypted data (created using `openpgp.createMessage`) to `openpgp.verify`.
Published: 2025-05-19T18:57:05.602Z
Updated: 2025-05-20T13:02:58.605Z Reference links
|
Imported from gcve-enriched-dumps CVE data |
CVE:CVE-2023-41037 |
vulnerable | 2026-06-08 06:11:04.878262 |
Cleartext Signed Message Signature Spoofing in openpgpjs
MEDIUM (4.3)
OpenPGP.js is a JavaScript implementation of the OpenPGP protocol. In affected versions OpenPGP Cleartext Signed Messages are cryptographically signed messages where the signed text is readable without special tools. These messages typically contain a "Hash: ..." header declaring the hash algorithm used to compute the signature digest. OpenPGP.js up to v5.9.0 ignored any data preceding the "Hash: ..." texts when verifying the signature. As a result, malicious parties could add arbitrary text to a third-party Cleartext Signed Message, to lead the victim to believe that the arbitrary text was signed. A user or application is vulnerable to said attack vector if it verifies the CleartextMessage by only checking the returned `verified` property, discarding the associated `data` information, and instead _visually trusting_ the contents of the original message. Since `verificationResult.data` would always contain the actual signed data, users and apps that check this information are not vulnerable. Similarly, given a CleartextMessage object, retrieving the data using `getText()` or the `text` field returns only the contents that are considered when verifying the signature. Finally, re-armoring a CleartextMessage object (using `armor()` will also result in a "sanitised" version, with the extraneous text being removed. This issue has been addressed in version 5.10.1 (current stable version) which will reject messages when calling `openpgp.readCleartextMessage()` and in version 4.10.11 (legacy version) which will will reject messages when calling `openpgp.cleartext.readArmored()`. Users are advised to upgrade. Users unable to upgrade should check the contents of `verificationResult.data` to see what data was actually signed, rather than visually trusting the contents of the armored message.
Published: 2023-08-29T16:46:47.708Z
Updated: 2024-09-30T17:43:47.802Z |
Imported from gcve-enriched-dumps CVE data |
CVE:CVE-2019-9155 |
vulnerable | 2026-06-08 05:14:25.055304 |
Details available
A cryptographic issue in OpenPGP.js <=4.2.0 allows an attacker who is able provide forged messages and gain feedback about whether decryption of these messages succeeded to conduct an invalid curve attack in order to gain the victim's ECDH private key.
Published: 2019-08-22T15:48:57.000Z
Updated: 2024-08-04T21:38:46.575Z Reference links
|
Imported from gcve-enriched-dumps CVE data |
CVE:CVE-2019-9154 |
vulnerable | 2026-06-08 05:14:25.054927 |
Details available
Improper Verification of a Cryptographic Signature in OpenPGP.js <=4.1.2 allows an attacker to pass off unsigned data as signed.
Published: 2019-08-22T15:39:28.000Z
Updated: 2024-08-04T21:38:46.635Z Reference links
|
Imported from gcve-enriched-dumps CVE data |
CVE:CVE-2019-9153 |
vulnerable | 2026-06-08 05:14:25.054279 |
Details available
Improper Verification of a Cryptographic Signature in OpenPGP.js <=4.1.2 allows an attacker to forge signed messages by replacing its signatures with a "standalone" or "timestamp" signature.
Published: 2019-08-22T15:30:33.000Z
Updated: 2024-08-04T21:38:46.485Z Reference links
|
Imported from gcve-enriched-dumps CVE data |
CVE:CVE-2015-8013 |
vulnerable | 2026-06-08 05:07:02.870345 | db.gcve.eu details were skipped to keep the page responsive. | Imported from gcve-enriched-dumps CVE data |
Contribute
You can submit an edit proposal for this CPE entry or suggest a related product/vendor addition using the action button above.
Inspect record JSON
Open this panel to browse, search, copy or download the JSON record.