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cpe:2.3:a:openzeppelin:contracts:*:*:*:*:*:cairo:*:*
part: a version: * update: *
| Vendor | Openzeppelin (e0e03368-afa5-5522-8058-af42a8cb296b) |
|---|---|
| Product | Contracts (adf340f6-9b56-5cf6-9a4d-258b9794268c) |
| Edition | * |
| Language | * |
| Software edition | * |
| Target software | cairo |
| Target hardware | * |
| Other | * |
| Notes | Imported from purl2cpe mapping |
PURL mappings
| PURL | Source | Last updated |
|---|---|---|
pkg:github/openzeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts |
purl2cpe | 2026-06-01 10:15:44.589798 |
pkg:npm/%40openzeppelin/contracts |
purl2cpe | 2026-06-01 10:15:44.589800 |
Vulnerability references
| Identifier | cpeApplicability | Submitted | db.gcve.eu details | Rationale |
|---|---|---|---|---|
CVE:CVE-2024-45304 |
vulnerable | 2026-06-08 06:45:55.849380 |
OwnableTwoStep allows a pending owner to accept ownership after the original owner has renounced ownership in cairo-contracts
MEDIUM (5.3)
Cairo-Contracts are OpenZeppelin Contracts written in Cairo for Starknet, a decentralized ZK Rollup. This vulnerability can lead to unauthorized ownership transfer, contrary to the original owner's intention of leaving the contract without an owner. It introduces a security risk where an unintended party (pending owner) can gain control of the contract after the original owner has renounced ownership. This could also be used by a malicious owner to simulate leaving a contract without an owner, to later regain ownership by previously having proposed himself as a pending owner. This issue has been addressed in release version 0.16.0. All users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.
Published: 2024-08-30T23:51:01.301Z
Updated: 2024-09-03T19:52:20.818Z |
Imported from gcve-enriched-dumps CVE data |
CVE:CVE-2023-23940 |
vulnerable | 2026-06-08 05:56:04.871423 |
OpenZeppelin Contracts for Cairo is vulnerable to signature validation bypass
MEDIUM (6.4)
OpenZeppelin Contracts for Cairo is a library for secure smart contract development written in Cairo for StarkNet, a decentralized ZK Rollup. `is_valid_eth_signature` is missing a call to `finalize_keccak` after calling `verify_eth_signature`. As a result, any contract using `is_valid_eth_signature` from the account library (such as the `EthAccount` preset) is vulnerable to a malicious sequencer. Specifically, the malicious sequencer would be able to bypass signature validation to impersonate an instance of these accounts. The issue has been patched in 0.6.1.
Published: 2023-02-03T19:43:11.178Z
Updated: 2025-03-10T21:16:55.772Z |
Imported from gcve-enriched-dumps CVE data |
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