Melange

melange allows users to build apk packages using declarative pipelines. Starting in version 0.32.0 and prior to version 0.43.4, `melange lint --persist-lint-results` (opt-in flag, also usable via `melange build --persist-lint-results`) constructs output file paths by joining `--out-dir` with the `arch` and `pkgname` values read from the `.PKGINFO` control file of the APK being linted. In affected versions these values were not validated for path separators or `..` sequences, so an attacker who can supply an APK to a melange-based lint/build pipeline (e.g. CI that lints third-party APKs, or build-as-a-service) could cause melange to write `lint-<pkgname>-<pkgver>-r<epoch>.json` to an arbitrary `.json` path reachable by the melange process. The written file is a JSON lint report whose content is partially attacker-influenced. There is no direct code-execution path, but the write can clobber other JSON artifacts on the filesystem. The issue only affects deployments that explicitly pass `--persist-lint-results`; the flag is off by default. The issue is fixed in melange v0.43.4 by validating `arch` and `pkgname` for `..`, `/`, and `filepath.Separator` before path construction in `pkg/linter/results.go` (commit 84f3b45). As a workaround, do not pass `--persist-lint-results` when linting or building APKs whose `.PKGINFO` contents are not fully trusted. Running melange as a low-privileged user and confining writes to an isolated directory also limits impact.

Published: 2026-04-24T00:00:36.253Z
Updated: 2026-04-24T13:10:10.825Z

melange allows users to build apk packages using declarative pipelines. Starting in version 0.32.0 and prior to version 0.43.4, an attacker who can influence a melange configuration file — for example through pull-request-driven CI or build-as-a-service scenarios — could set `pipeline[].uses` to a value containing `../` sequences or an absolute path. The `(*Compiled).compilePipeline` function in `pkg/build/compile.go` passed `uses` directly to `filepath.Join(pipelineDir, uses + ".yaml")` without validating the value, so the resolved path could escape each `--pipeline-dir` and read an arbitrary YAML-parseable file visible to the melange process. Because the loaded file is subsequently interpreted as a melange pipeline and its `runs:` block is executed via `/bin/sh -c` in the build sandbox, this additionally allowed shell commands sourced from an out-of-tree file to run during the build, bypassing the review boundary that normally covers the in-tree pipeline definition. The issue is fixed in melange v0.43.4 via commit 5829ca4. The fix rejects `uses` values that are absolute paths or contain `..`, and verifies (via `filepath.Rel` after `filepath.Clean`) that the resolved target remains within the pipeline directory. As a workaround, only run `melange build` against configuration files from trusted sources. In CI systems that build user-supplied melange configs, gate builds behind manual review of `pipeline[].uses` values and reject any containing `..` or leading `/`.

Published: 2026-04-23T23:58:39.668Z
Updated: 2026-04-25T01:38:30.604Z

melange allows users to build apk packages using declarative pipelines. In version 0.40.5 and prior, melange update-cache downloads URIs from build configs via io.Copy without any size limit or HTTP client timeout (pkg/renovate/cache/cache.go). An attacker-controlled URI in a melange config can cause unbounded disk writes, exhausting disk on the build runne. Version 0.43.4 contains a patch.

Published: 2026-03-06T07:03:10.361Z
Updated: 2026-07-07T13:10:28.323Z

melange allows users to build apk packages using declarative pipelines. From version 0.14.0 to before 0.40.3, an attacker who can influence a melange configuration file (e.g., through pull request-driven CI or build-as-a-service scenarios) could read arbitrary files from the host system. The LicensingInfos function in pkg/config/config.go reads license files specified in copyright[].license-path without validating that paths remain within the workspace directory, allowing path traversal via ../ sequences. The contents of the traversed file are embedded into the generated SBOM as license text, enabling exfiltration of sensitive data through build artifacts. This issue has been patched in version 0.40.3.

Published: 2026-02-04T19:32:35.907Z
Updated: 2026-02-05T14:32:56.438Z

melange allows users to build apk packages using declarative pipelines. From version 0.10.0 to before 0.40.3, an attacker who can influence inputs to the patch pipeline could execute arbitrary shell commands on the build host. The patch pipeline in pkg/build/pipelines/patch.yaml embeds input-derived values (series paths, patch filenames, and numeric parameters) into shell scripts without proper quoting or validation, allowing shell metacharacters to break out of their intended context. The vulnerability affects the built-in patch pipeline which can be invoked through melange build and melange license-check operations. An attacker who can control patch-related inputs (e.g., through pull request-driven CI, build-as-a-service, or by influencing melange configurations) can inject shell metacharacters such as backticks, command substitutions $(…), semicolons, pipes, or redirections to execute arbitrary commands with the privileges of the melange build process. This issue has been patched in version 0.40.3.

Published: 2026-02-04T19:32:17.216Z
Updated: 2026-02-05T14:33:04.735Z