Fastify

Summary When trustProxy is configured with a restrictive trust function (e.g., a specific IP like trustProxy: '10.0.0.1', a subnet, a hop count, or a custom function), the request.protocol and request.host getters read X-Forwarded-Proto and X-Forwarded-Host headers from any connection — including connections from untrusted IPs. This allows an attacker connecting directly to Fastify (bypassing the proxy) to spoof both the protocol and host seen by the application. Affected Versions fastify <= 5.8.2 Impact Applications using request.protocol or request.host for security decisions (HTTPS enforcement, secure cookie flags, CSRF origin checks, URL construction, host-based routing) are affected when trustProxy is configured with a restrictive trust function. When trustProxy: true (trust everything), both host and protocol trust all forwarded headers — this is expected behavior. The vulnerability only manifests with restrictive trust configurations.

Published: 2026-03-23T13:53:00.386Z
Updated: 2026-03-23T15:30:10.526Z

Fastify incorrectly accepts malformed `Content-Type` headers containing trailing characters after the subtype token, in violation of RFC 9110 §8.3.1(https://httpwg.org/specs/rfc9110.html#field.content-type). For example, a request sent with Content-Type: application/json garbage passes validation and is processed normally, rather than being rejected with 415 Unsupported Media Type. When regex-based content-type parsers are in use (a documented Fastify feature), the malformed value is matched against registered parsers using the full string including the trailing garbage. This means a request with an invalid content-type may be routed to and processed by a parser it should never have reached. Impact: An attacker can send requests with RFC-invalid Content-Type headers that bypass validity checks, reach content-type parser matching, and be processed by the server. Requests that should be rejected at the validation stage are instead handled as if the content-type were valid. Workarounds: Deploy a WAF rule to protect against this Fix: The fix is available starting with v5.8.1.

Published: 2026-03-06T17:50:58.714Z
Updated: 2026-03-09T14:55:21.011Z

Impact: Fastify applications using schema.body.content for per-content-type body validation can have validation bypassed entirely by prepending a space to the Content-Type header. The body is still parsed correctly but schema validation is skipped. This is a regression introduced in fastify >= 5.3.2 by the fix for CVE-2025-32442 Patches: Upgrade to fastify v5.8.5 or later. Workarounds: None. Upgrade to the patched version.

Published: 2026-04-15T00:14:02.376Z
Updated: 2026-07-15T01:06:02.186Z

Fastify is a fast and low overhead web framework, for Node.js. Prior to version 5.7.3, a denial-of-service vulnerability in Fastify’s Web Streams response handling can allow a remote client to exhaust server memory. Applications that return a ReadableStream (or Response with a Web Stream body) via reply.send() are impacted. A slow or non-reading client can trigger unbounded buffering when backpressure is ignored, leading to process crashes or severe degradation. This issue has been patched in version 5.7.3.

Published: 2026-02-03T21:21:35.437Z
Updated: 2026-02-04T16:20:32.845Z

Fastify is a fast and low overhead web framework, for Node.js. Prior to version 5.7.2, a validation bypass vulnerability exists in Fastify where request body validation schemas specified by Content-Type can be completely circumvented. By appending a tab character (\t) followed by arbitrary content to the Content-Type header, attackers can bypass body validation while the server still processes the body as the original content type. This issue has been patched in version 5.7.2.

Published: 2026-02-03T21:21:40.268Z
Updated: 2026-07-15T01:16:33.370Z