Open Xchange Appsuite Backend

Functions with insufficient randomness were used to generate authorization tokens of the integrated oAuth Authorization Service. Authorization codes were predictable for third parties and could be used to intercept and take over the client authorization process. As a result, other users accounts could be compromised. The oAuth Authorization Service is not enabled by default. We have updated the implementation to use sources with sufficient randomness to generate authorization tokens. No publicly available exploits are known.

Published: 2023-08-02T12:23:47.407Z
Updated: 2024-08-02T11:53:52.923Z

Full-text autocomplete search allows user-provided SQL syntax to be injected to SQL statements. With existing sanitization in place, this can be abused to trigger benign SQL Exceptions but could potentially be escalated to a malicious SQL injection vulnerability. We now properly encode single quotes for SQL FULLTEXT queries. No publicly available exploits are known.

Published: 2023-08-02T12:23:17.319Z
Updated: 2024-08-02T11:46:24.682Z

Attackers with access to the "documentconverterws" API were able to inject serialized Java objects, that were not properly checked during deserialization. Access to this API endpoint is restricted to local networks by default. Arbitrary code could be injected that is being executed when processing the request. A check has been introduced to restrict processing of legal and expected classes for this API. We now log a warning in case there are attempts to inject illegal classes. No publicly available exploits are known.

Published: 2023-06-20T07:52:02.018Z
Updated: 2024-08-02T11:46:24.572Z

It was possible to call filesystem and network references using the local LibreOffice instance using manipulated ODT documents. Attackers could discover restricted network topology and services as well as including local files with read permissions of the open-xchange system user. This was limited to specific file-types, like images. We have improved existing content filters and validators to avoid including any local resources. No publicly available exploits are known.

Published: 2023-06-20T07:51:58.299Z
Updated: 2024-08-02T11:46:24.624Z

When adding an external mail account, processing of POP3 "capabilities" responses are not limited to plausible sizes. Attacker with access to a rogue POP3 service could trigger requests that lead to excessive resource usage and eventually service unavailability. We now limit accepted POP3 server response to reasonable length/size. No publicly available exploits are known.

Published: 2023-06-20T07:51:53.500Z
Updated: 2024-08-02T11:46:24.577Z