Jupyterlab

JupyterLab versions >=4.6.0,<=4.6.1 and <=4.5.9 contain an allowlist/blocklist enforcement gap in PyPIExtensionManager.install(). A missing 'await' caused the is_install_allowed coroutine to never execute, so the extension allowlist/blocklist check was not enforced for direct callers of install(). The stock JupyterLab HTTP API and Extension Manager UI are not affected, as they perform a separate, correctly awaited check. The issue affects only deployments where a custom extension or downstream integration imports PyPIExtensionManager and calls install() directly with a package name influenced by untrusted input, an allowlist/blocklist is configured, the PyPI Extension Manager is enabled, and kernels and terminals are disabled or delegated to remote hosts. Fixed in JupyterLab 4.6.2 and 4.5.10.

Published: 2026-08-13T11:28:25.551Z
Updated: 2026-08-28T13:45:55.401Z

JupyterLab before 4.5.9 contains a stored cross-site scripting vulnerability in the Extension Manager that fails to validate URI protocols in package metadata URLs. Attackers can publish malicious PyPI packages with javascript: URLs in project metadata that execute arbitrary JavaScript in the JupyterLab origin when users click the extension name.

Published: 2026-08-01T12:22:17.437Z
Updated: 2026-08-03T19:36:40.296Z

jupyterlab is an extensible environment for interactive and reproducible computing, based on the Jupyter Notebook Architecture. Prior to version 4.4.8, links generated with LaTeX typesetters in Markdown files and Markdown cells in JupyterLab and Jupyter Notebook did not include the noopener attribute. This is deemed to have no impact on the default installations. Theoretically users of third-party LaTeX-rendering extensions could find themselves vulnerable to reverse tabnabbing attacks if links generated by those extensions included target=_blank (no such extensions are known at time of writing) and they were to click on a link generated in LaTeX (typically visibly different from other links). This issue has been patched in version 4.4.8.

Published: 2025-09-26T15:53:37.253Z
Updated: 2025-09-26T17:52:42.227Z

jupyterlab is an extensible environment for interactive and reproducible computing, based on the Jupyter Notebook Architecture. This vulnerability depends on user interaction by opening a malicious notebook with Markdown cells, or Markdown file using JupyterLab preview feature. A malicious user can access any data that the attacked user has access to as well as perform arbitrary requests acting as the attacked user. JupyterLab v3.6.8, v4.2.5 and Jupyter Notebook v7.2.2 have been patched to resolve this issue. Users are advised to upgrade. There is no workaround for the underlying DOM Clobbering susceptibility. However, select plugins can be disabled on deployments which cannot update in a timely fashion to minimise the risk. These are: 1. `@jupyterlab/mathjax-extension:plugin` - users will loose ability to preview mathematical equations. 2. `@jupyterlab/markdownviewer-extension:plugin` - users will loose ability to open Markdown previews. 3. `@jupyterlab/mathjax2-extension:plugin` (if installed with optional `jupyterlab-mathjax2` package) - an older version of the mathjax plugin for JupyterLab 4.x. To disable these extensions run: ```jupyter labextension disable @jupyterlab/markdownviewer-extension:plugin && jupyter labextension disable @jupyterlab/mathjax-extension:plugin && jupyter labextension disable @jupyterlab/mathjax2-extension:plugin ``` in bash.

Published: 2024-08-28T19:43:20.007Z
Updated: 2024-08-28T19:58:57.799Z

JupyterLab extension template is a `copier` template for JupyterLab extensions. Repositories created using this template with `test` option include `update-integration-tests.yml` workflow which has an RCE vulnerability. Extension authors hosting their code on GitHub are urged to upgrade the template to the latest version. Users who made changes to `update-integration-tests.yml`, accept overwriting of this file and re-apply your changes later. Users may wish to temporarily disable GitHub Actions while working on the upgrade. We recommend rebasing all open pull requests from untrusted users as actions may run using the version from the `main` branch at the time when the pull request was created. Users who are upgrading from template version prior to 4.3.0 may wish to leave out proposed changes to the release workflow for now as it requires additional configuration.

Published: 2024-07-16T17:37:49.241Z
Updated: 2024-08-16T04:01:14.791Z