Enigmail

In Enigmail below 2.1, an attacker in possession of PGP encrypted emails can wrap them as sub-parts within a crafted multipart email. The encrypted part(s) can further be hidden using HTML/CSS or ASCII newline characters. This modified multipart email can be re-sent by the attacker to the intended receiver. If the receiver replies to this (benign looking) email, he unknowingly leaks the plaintext of the encrypted message part(s) back to the attacker. This attack variant bypasses protection mechanisms implemented after the "EFAIL" attacks.

Published: 2019-08-05T19:25:58.000Z
Updated: 2024-08-05T00:19:41.418Z

Enigmail before 2.0.11 allows PGP signature spoofing: for an inline PGP message, an attacker can cause the product to display a "correctly signed" message indication, but display different unauthenticated text.

Published: 2019-05-21T19:50:08.000Z
Updated: 2024-08-04T23:17:39.675Z

Enigmail before 2.0.6 is prone to to OpenPGP signatures being spoofed for arbitrary messages using a PGP/INLINE signature wrapped within a specially crafted multipart HTML email.

Published: 2019-02-11T17:00:00.000Z
Updated: 2024-08-05T10:01:54.583Z

The signature verification routine in Enigmail before 2.0.7 interprets user ids as status/control messages and does not correctly keep track of the status of multiple signatures, which allows remote attackers to spoof arbitrary email signatures via public keys containing crafted primary user ids.

Published: 2018-06-13T23:00:00.000Z
Updated: 2024-08-05T08:24:03.616Z

An issue was discovered in Enigmail before 1.9.9. In a variant of CVE-2017-17847, signature spoofing is possible for multipart/related messages because a signed message part can be referenced with a cid: URI but not actually displayed. In other words, the entire containing message appears to be signed, but the recipient does not see any of the signed text.

Published: 2017-12-22T23:00:00.000Z
Updated: 2024-08-05T21:06:48.930Z