Wasmtime

Wasmtime is a runtime for WebAssembly. From 30.0.0 to 36.0.8, 43.0.2, and 44.0.1, Wasmtime's allocation logic for a WebAssembly table contained checked arithmetic which panicked on overflow. This overflow is possible to trigger, and thus panic, when a table with an extremely large size is allocated. This is possible with the WebAssembly memory64 proposal where tables can have sizes in the 64-bit range as opposed to the previous 32-bit range which would not overflow. The panic happens when attempting to create a very large table, such as when instantiating a WebAssembly module or component. This vulnerability is fixed in 36.0.8, 43.0.2, and 44.0.1.

Published: 2026-05-14T14:54:32.975Z
Updated: 2026-07-28T12:04:48.026Z

Wasmtime is a runtime for WebAssembly. Prior to 24.0.7, 36.0.7, 42.0.2, and 43.0.1, Wasmtime's implementation of transcoding strings between components contains a bug where the return value of a guest component's realloc is not validated before the host attempts to write through the pointer. This enables a guest to cause the host to write arbitrary transcoded string bytes to an arbitrary location up to 4GiB away from the base of linear memory. These writes on the host could hit unmapped memory or could corrupt host data structures depending on Wasmtime's configuration. Wasmtime by default reserves 4GiB of virtual memory for a guest's linear memory meaning that this bug will by default on hosts cause the host to hit unmapped memory and abort the process due to an unhandled fault. Wasmtime can be configured, however, to reserve less memory for a guest and to remove all guard pages, so some configurations of Wasmtime may lead to corruption of data outside of a guest's linear memory, such as host data structures or other guests's linear memories. This vulnerability is fixed in 24.0.7, 36.0.7, 42.0.2, and 43.0.1.

Published: 2026-04-09T18:55:56.467Z
Updated: 2026-04-13T15:38:27.294Z

Wasmtime is a runtime for WebAssembly. From 25.0.0 to before 36.0.7, 42.0.2, and 43.0.1, Wasmtime's Winch compiler backend contains a bug where translating the table.grow operator causes the result to be incorrectly typed. For 32-bit tables this means that the result of the operator, internally in Winch, is tagged as a 64-bit value instead of a 32-bit value. This invalid internal representation of Winch's compiler state compounds into further issues depending on how the value is consumed. The primary consequence of this bug is that bytes in the host's address space can be stored/read from. This is only applicable to the 16 bytes before linear memory, however, as the only significant return value of table.grow that can be misinterpreted is -1. The bytes before linear memory are, by default, unmapped memory. Wasmtime will detect this fault and abort the process, however, because wasm should not be able to access these bytes. Overall this this bug in Winch represents a DoS vector by crashing the host process, a correctness issue within Winch, and a possible leak of up to 16-bytes before linear memory. Wasmtime's default compiler is Cranelift, not Winch, and Wasmtime's default settings are to place guard pages before linear memory. This means that Wasmtime's default configuration is not affected by this issue, and when explicitly choosing Winch Wasmtime's otherwise default configuration leads to a DoS. Disabling guard pages before linear memory is required to possibly leak up to 16-bytes of host data. This vulnerability is fixed in 36.0.7, 42.0.2, and 43.0.1.

Published: 2026-04-09T18:54:48.760Z
Updated: 2026-04-13T20:18:21.954Z

Wasmtime is a runtime for WebAssembly. From 28.0.0 to before 36.0.7, 42.0.2, and 43.0.1, Wasmtime's implementation of its pooling allocator contains a bug where in certain configurations the contents of linear memory can be leaked from one instance to the next. The implementation of resetting the virtual memory permissions for linear memory used the wrong predicate to determine if resetting was necessary, where the compilation process used a different predicate. This divergence meant that the pooling allocator incorrectly deduced at runtime that resetting virtual memory permissions was not necessary while compile-time determine that virtual memory could be relied upon. The pooling allocator must be in use, Config::memory_guard_size configuration option must be 0, Config::memory_reservation configuration must be less than 4GiB, and pooling allocator must be configured with max_memory_size the same as the memory_reservation value in order to exploit this vulnerability. If all of these conditions are applicable then when a linear memory is reused the VM permissions of the previous iteration are not reset. This means that the compiled code, which is assuming out-of-bounds loads will segfault, will not actually segfault and can read the previous contents of linear memory if it was previously mapped. This represents a data leakage vulnerability between guest WebAssembly instances which breaks WebAssembly's semantics and additionally breaks the sandbox that Wasmtime provides. Wasmtime is not vulnerable to this issue with its default settings, nor with the default settings of the pooling allocator, but embeddings are still allowed to configure these values to cause this vulnerability. This vulnerability is fixed in 36.0.7, 42.0.2, and 43.0.1.

Published: 2026-04-09T18:52:26.131Z
Updated: 2026-04-09T19:31:07.544Z

Wasmtime is a runtime for WebAssembly. From 25.0.0 to before 36.0.7, 42.0.2, and 43.0.1, Wasmtime with its Winch (baseline) non-default compiler backend may allow properly constructed guest Wasm to access host memory outside of its linear-memory sandbox. This vulnerability requires use of the Winch compiler (-Ccompiler=winch). By default, Wasmtime uses its Cranelift backend, not Winch. With Winch, the same incorrect assumption is present in theory on both aarch64 and x86-64. The aarch64 case has an observed-working proof of concept, while the x86-64 case is theoretical and may not be reachable in practice. This Winch compiler bug can allow the Wasm guest to access memory before or after the linear-memory region, independently of whether pre- or post-guard regions are configured. The accessible range in the initial bug proof-of-concept is up to 32KiB before the start of memory, or ~4GiB after the start of memory, independently of the size of pre- or post-guard regions or the use of explicit or guard-region-based bounds checking. However, the underlying bug assumes a 32-bit memory offset stored in a 64-bit register has its upper bits cleared when it may not, and so closely related variants of the initial proof-of-concept may be able to access truly arbitrary memory in-process. This could result in a host process segmentation fault (DoS), an arbitrary data leak from the host process, or with a write, potentially an arbitrary RCE. This vulnerability is fixed in 36.0.7, 42.0.2, and 43.0.1.

Published: 2026-04-09T18:48:33.552Z
Updated: 2026-04-10T14:12:55.374Z