Cacti

Cacti is an open source performance and fault management framework. Versions 1.2.30 and prior have a package import signature validation bypass allows which allows self-signed packages. This issue has been fixed in version 1.2.31.

Published: 2026-06-25T23:01:30.937Z
Updated: 2026-06-26T14:57:48.522Z

Cacti is an open source performance and fault management framework. Versions 1.2.30 and prior are vulnerable to Path Traversal through the Report format_file Parameter, causing arbitrary file read. This vulnerability occurs in two stages. In the first stage (stored injection), lib/html_reports.php at line 283 stores $save['format_file'] = $post['format_file'] directly into the database without any validation. In the second stage (file read), lib/reports.php at line 667 concatenates CACTI_PATH_FORMATS . '/' . $format_file, and line 670 then calls file($format_file), reading arbitrary files from the filesystem. This issue has been fixed in version 1.2.31.

Published: 2026-06-25T22:43:47.441Z
Updated: 2026-06-26T12:44:37.984Z

Cacti is an open source performance and fault management framework. Versions 1.2.30 and prior have SQL Injection through unsanitized unserialize+implode in managers.php. At line 756 of managers.php, the application assigns $selected_items by calling cacti_unserialize(stripslashes(gnrv('selected_graphs_array'))). The cacti_unserialize() function calls unserialize() with allowed_classes set to false, which prevents object injection but still allows arbitrary string arrays to be deserialized. Then, at lines 760 to 766, the deserialized array values are passed directly into db_execute('DELETE FROM snmpagent_managers WHERE id IN (' . implode(',', $selected_items) . ')'), where they are imploded into the SQL statement without any integer validation, resulting in SQL Injection when using SNMP agent management permissions. This issue has been fixed in version 1.2.31.

Published: 2026-06-25T22:39:17.541Z
Updated: 2026-06-30T03:55:22.796Z

Cacti is an open source performance and fault management framework. Versions 1.2.30 and prior have missing session_regenerate_id() after login, leading to Session Fixation. session_regenerate_id() is NOT called after successful login. The login flow at auth_login.php:203-207 directly sets $_SESSION[SESS_USER_ID] without rotating the session ID. The session cookie configuration is otherwise good (httponly=true, samesite=Strict, secure=true for HTTPS at include/global.php:513-537), but these do not prevent session fixation via same-site vectors. This issue has been fixed in version 1.2.31.

Published: 2026-06-25T22:33:45.871Z
Updated: 2026-06-26T18:42:09.149Z

Cacti is an open source performance and fault management framework. Versions 1.2.30 and prior are vulnerable to Open Redirect through a substring check rather than a host check at str_contains($referer, CACTI_PATH_URL). When the user's login_opts == '1' (redirect to referer after login), the function used $_SERVER['HTTP_REFERER'] directly. An attacker could craft a referer such as https://evil.com/cacti/. Where CACTI_PATH_URL is /cacti/, the substring matches and the user is redirected to evil.com after login. The pre-existing validate_redirect_url() helper at lib/html_utility.php performed proper validation but was not invoked from auth_login_redirect(). This issue has been fixed in version 1.2.31.

Published: 2026-06-25T22:29:51.784Z
Updated: 2026-06-26T14:09:20.592Z