Spring Batch
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cpe:2.3:a:spring_by_vmware:spring_batch:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
part: a version: * update: *
| Vendor | Spring By Vmware (e0b0b549-71d2-5c8a-be30-1f02c144ba93) |
|---|---|
| Product | Spring Batch (902b69dc-7d85-53b2-9b83-207a46defa22) |
| Edition | * |
| Language | * |
| Software edition | * |
| Target software | * |
| Target hardware | * |
| Other | * |
| Notes | Imported from gcve-enriched-dumps CVE data |
PURL mappings
| PURL | Source | Last updated |
|---|---|---|
| No PURL mappings for this CPE yet. | ||
Vulnerability references
| Identifier | cpeApplicability | Submitted | db.gcve.eu details | Rationale |
|---|---|---|---|---|
CVE:CVE-2020-5411 |
vulnerable | 2026-06-08 05:26:42.797571 |
Jackson Configuration Allows Code Execution with Unknown "Serialization Gadgets"
When configured to enable default typing, Jackson contained a deserialization vulnerability that could lead to arbitrary code execution. Jackson fixed this vulnerability by blacklisting known "deserialization gadgets". Spring Batch configures Jackson with global default typing enabled which means that through the previous exploit, arbitrary code could be executed if all of the following is true: * Spring Batch's Jackson support is being leveraged to serialize a job's ExecutionContext. * A malicious user gains write access to the data store used by the JobRepository (where the data to be deserialized is stored). In order to protect against this type of attack, Jackson prevents a set of untrusted gadget classes from being deserialized. Spring Batch should be proactive against blocking unknown "deserialization gadgets" when enabling default typing.
Published: 2020-06-11T17:00:16.564Z
Updated: 2024-09-17T01:46:53.158Z Reference links |
Imported from gcve-enriched-dumps CVE data |
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