Oauth2 Proxy
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cpe:2.3:a:oauth2-proxy:oauth2-proxy:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*part: a version: * update: *
| Vendor | Oauth2 Proxy (7f7fb052-79e3-5b66-87e0-c8e40a24e6f7) |
|---|---|
| Product | Oauth2 Proxy (e35927c6-30cd-5b52-893a-7b31b937b47a) |
| Edition | * |
| Language | * |
| Software edition | * |
| Target software | * |
| Target hardware | * |
| Other | * |
Notes
Imported from gcve-enriched-dumps CVE data
PURL mappings
| PURL | Source | Last updated |
|---|---|---|
| No PURL mappings for this CPE yet. | ||
Vulnerability references
| Identifier | cpeApplicability | Submitted | db.gcve.eu details | Rationale |
|---|---|---|---|---|
CVE:CVE-2026-41059 |
vulnerable | 2026-06-08 08:03:14.664260 |
OAuth2 Proxy has an Authentication Bypass via Fragment Confusion in skip_auth_routes and skip_auth_regex
HIGH (8.2)
OAuth2 Proxy is a reverse proxy that provides authentication using OAuth2 providers. Versions 7.5.0 through 7.15.1 have a configuration-dependent authentication bypass. Deployments are affected when all of the following are true: Use of `skip_auth_routes` or the legacy `skip_auth_regex`; use of patterns that can be widened by attacker-controlled suffixes, such as `^/foo/.*/bar$` causing potential exposure of `/foo/secret`; and protected upstream applications that interpret `#` as a fragment delimiter or otherwise route the request to the protected base path. In deployments that rely on these settings, an unauthenticated attacker can send a crafted request containing a number sign in the path, including the browser-safe encoded form `%23`, so that OAuth2 Proxy matches a public allowlist rule while the backend serves a protected resource. Deployments that do not use these skip-auth options, or that only allow exact public paths with tightly scoped method and path rules, are not affected. A fix has been implemented in version 7.15.2 to normalize request paths more conservatively before skip-auth matching so fragment content does not influence allowlist decisions. Users who cannot upgrade immediately can reduce exposure by tightening or removing `skip_auth_routes` and `skip_auth_regex` rules, especially patterns that use broad wildcards across path segments. Recommended mitigations include replacing broad rules with exact, anchored public paths and explicit HTTP methods; rejecting requests whose path contains `%23` or `#` at the ingress, load balancer, or WAF level; and/or avoiding placing sensitive application paths behind broad `skip_auth_routes` rules.
Published: 2026-04-21T23:17:46.743Z
Updated: 2026-04-22T13:13:50.227Z |
Imported from gcve-enriched-dumps CVE data |
CVE:CVE-2026-40575 |
vulnerable | 2026-06-08 08:01:20.849949 |
OAuth2 Proxy has an Authentication Bypass via X-Forwarded-Uri Header Spoofing
CRITICAL (9.1)
OAuth2 Proxy is a reverse proxy that provides authentication using OAuth2 providers. Versions 7.5.0 through 7.15.1 may trust a client-supplied `X-Forwarded-Uri` header when `--reverse-proxy` is enabled and `--skip-auth-regex` or `--skip-auth-route` is configured. An attacker can spoof this header so OAuth2 Proxy evaluates authentication and skip-auth rules against a different path than the one actually sent to the upstream application. This can result in an unauthenticated remote attacker bypassing authentication and accessing protected routes without a valid session. Impacted users are deployments that run oauth2-proxy with `--reverse-proxy` enabled and configure at least one `--skip-auth-regex` or `--skip-auth-route` rule. This issue is patched in `v7.15.2`. Some workarounds are available for those who cannot upgrade immediately. Strip any client-provided `X-Forwarded-Uri` header at the reverse proxy or load balancer level; explicitly overwrite `X-Forwarded-Uri` with the actual request URI before forwarding requests to OAuth2 Proxy; restrict direct client access to OAuth2 Proxy so it can only be reached through a trusted reverse proxy; and/or remove or narrow `--skip-auth-regex` / `--skip-auth-route` rules where possible. For nginx-based deployments, ensure `X-Forwarded-Uri` is set by nginx and not passed through from the client.
Published: 2026-04-21T23:20:30.486Z
Updated: 2026-07-15T01:00:45.240Z |
Imported from gcve-enriched-dumps CVE data |
CVE:CVE-2026-40574 |
vulnerable | 2026-06-08 08:01:20.848664 |
OAuth2 Proxy has an Authorization Bypass in Email Domain Validation via Malformed Multi-@ Email Claims
MEDIUM (6.8)
OAuth2 Proxy is a reverse proxy that provides authentication using OAuth2 providers. Prior to 7.15.2, an authorization bypass exists in OAuth2 Proxy as part of the email_domain enforcement option. An attacker may be able to authenticate with an email claim such as attacker@evil.com@company.com and satisfy an allowed domain check for company.com, even though the claim is not a valid email address. The issue ONLY affects deployments that rely on email_domain restrictions and accept email claim values from identity providers or claim mappings that do not strictly enforce normal email syntax. This vulnerability is fixed in 7.15.2.
Published: 2026-04-21T16:32:34.537Z
Updated: 2026-04-21T20:37:28.072Z |
Imported from gcve-enriched-dumps CVE data |
CVE:CVE-2026-34457 |
vulnerable | 2026-06-08 07:59:12.529180 |
OAuth2 Proxy: Health Check User-Agent Matching Bypasses Authentication in auth_request Mode
CRITICAL (9.1)
OAuth2 Proxy is a reverse proxy that provides authentication using OAuth2 providers. Versions prior to 7.15.2 contain a configuration-dependent authentication bypass in deployments where OAuth2 Proxy is used with an auth_request-style integration (such as nginx auth_request) and either --ping-user-agent is set or --gcp-healthchecks is enabled. In affected configurations, OAuth2 Proxy treats any request with the configured health check User-Agent value as a successful health check regardless of the requested path, allowing an unauthenticated remote attacker to bypass authentication and access protected upstream resources. Deployments that do not use auth_request-style subrequests or that do not enable --ping-user-agent/--gcp-healthchecks are not affected. This issue is fixed in 7.15.2.
Published: 2026-04-14T22:14:38.937Z
Updated: 2026-04-15T17:43:30.711Z |
Imported from gcve-enriched-dumps CVE data |
CVE:CVE-2026-34454 |
vulnerable | 2026-06-08 07:59:12.520404 |
OAuth2 Proxy: Session cookie not cleared when rendering sign-in page
LOW (3.5)
OAuth2 Proxy is a reverse proxy that provides authentication using OAuth2 providers. A regression introduced in 7.11.0 prevents OAuth2 Proxy from clearing the session cookie when rendering the sign-in page. In deployments that rely on the sign-in page as part of their logout flow, a user may be shown the sign-in page while the existing session cookie remains valid, meaning the browser session is not actually logged out. On shared workstations or devices, a subsequent user could continue to use the previous user's authenticated session. Deployments that use a dedicated logout/sign-out endpoint to terminate sessions are not affected. This issue is fixed in 7.15.2
Published: 2026-04-14T22:10:37.901Z
Updated: 2026-04-15T13:30:10.300Z |
Imported from gcve-enriched-dumps CVE data |
CVE:CVE-2025-64484 |
vulnerable | 2026-06-08 07:39:19.831861 | db.gcve.eu details were skipped to keep the page responsive. | Imported from gcve-enriched-dumps CVE data |
CVE:CVE-2025-54576 |
vulnerable | 2026-06-08 07:33:12.874773 | db.gcve.eu details were skipped to keep the page responsive. | Imported from gcve-enriched-dumps CVE data |
CVE:CVE-2021-21411 |
vulnerable | 2026-06-08 05:29:11.974409 | db.gcve.eu details were skipped to keep the page responsive. | Imported from gcve-enriched-dumps CVE data |
CVE:CVE-2021-21291 |
vulnerable | 2026-06-08 05:29:11.535978 | db.gcve.eu details were skipped to keep the page responsive. | Imported from gcve-enriched-dumps CVE data |
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