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cpe:2.3:a:projen_project:projen:*:*:*:*:*:node.js:*:*part: a version: * update: *
| Vendor | Projen Project (c81432df-2e62-5c35-94ce-3a654671450c) |
|---|---|
| Product | Projen (4260c75e-ed4f-5099-859f-b302c869431c) |
| Edition | * |
| Language | * |
| Software edition | * |
| Target software | node.js |
| Target hardware | * |
| Other | * |
Notes
Imported from gcve-enriched-dumps CVE data
PURL mappings
| PURL | Source | Last updated |
|---|---|---|
| No PURL mappings for this CPE yet. | ||
Vulnerability references
| Identifier | cpeApplicability | Submitted | db.gcve.eu details | Rationale |
|---|---|---|---|---|
CVE:CVE-2021-21423 |
vulnerable | 2026-06-08 05:29:11.999060 |
Exposure of Version-Control Repository to an Unauthorized Control Sphere in projen
MEDIUM (6.8)
`projen` is a project generation tool that synthesizes project configuration files such as `package.json`, `tsconfig.json`, `.gitignore`, GitHub Workflows, `eslint`, `jest`, and more, from a well-typed definition written in JavaScript. Users of projen's `NodeProject` project type (including any project type derived from it) include a `.github/workflows/rebuild-bot.yml` workflow that may allow any GitHub user to trigger execution of un-trusted code in the context of the "main" repository (as opposed to that of a fork). In some situations, such untrusted code may potentially be able to commit to the "main" repository. The rebuild-bot workflow is triggered by comments including `@projen rebuild` on pull-request to trigger a re-build of the projen project, and updating the pull request with the updated files. This workflow is triggered by an `issue_comment` event, and thus always executes with a `GITHUB_TOKEN` belonging to the repository into which the pull-request is made (this is in contrast with workflows triggered by `pull_request` events, which always execute with a `GITHUB_TOKEN` belonging to the repository from which the pull-request is made). Repositories that do not have branch protection configured on their default branch (typically `main` or `master`) could possibly allow an untrusted user to gain access to secrets configured on the repository (such as NPM tokens, etc). Branch protection prohibits this escalation, as the managed `GITHUB_TOKEN` would not be able to modify the contents of a protected branch and affected workflows must be defined on the default branch.
Published: 2021-04-06T18:35:14.000Z
Updated: 2024-08-03T18:09:16.091Z |
Imported from gcve-enriched-dumps CVE data |
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