Rocket.Chat

Rocket.Chat is an open-source, secure, fully customizable communications platform. Prior to 7.10.14, 8.0.8, 8.1.7, 8.2.7, 8.3.7, 8.4.5, 8.5.2, and 8.6.1, the stream-notify-user stream in the WebSocket protocol allows an authenticated user to write arbitrary notification bodies because the sender is not checked, and the client-side UI can create an ephemeral fake message in another user's currently open chat. This issue is fixed in versions 7.10.14, 8.0.8, 8.1.7, 8.2.7, 8.3.7, 8.4.5, 8.5.2, and 8.6.1.

Published: 2026-08-10T21:42:36.707Z
Updated: 2026-08-11T16:04:45.242Z

Rocket.Chat is an open-source, secure, fully customizable communications platform. Prior to 7.10.14, 8.0.8, 8.1.7, 8.2.7, 8.3.7, 8.4.5, 8.5.2, and 8.6.1, the channels.convertToTeam REST endpoint allows an authenticated registered user with the create-team permission to convert an unrelated public channel by supplying channelName instead of channelId because the edit-room permission is checked only for channelId. This issue is fixed in versions 7.10.14, 8.0.8, 8.1.7, 8.2.7, 8.3.7, 8.4.5, 8.5.2, and 8.6.1.

Published: 2026-08-10T21:44:59.115Z
Updated: 2026-08-11T14:26:15.712Z

Rocket.Chat is an open-source, secure, fully customizable communications platform. Prior to 8.5.1, 8.4.4, 8.3.6, 8.2.6, 8.1.6, 8.0.7, and 7.10.13, the POST /api/v1/fingerprint REST endpoint enforces authentication (authRequired: true) but performs no authorization check. Any authenticated user — including a standard user role account — can call this endpoint with {"setDeploymentAs": "new-workspace"} to permanently deregister the workspace from Rocket.Chat Cloud. This wipes all cloud credentials, removes the workspace license, breaks push notifications for all users, and requires manual re-registration to recover. This vulnerability is fixed in 8.5.1, 8.4.4, 8.3.6, 8.2.6, 8.1.6, 8.0.7, and 7.10.13.

Published: 2026-06-24T21:08:01.271Z
Updated: 2026-06-25T12:34:32.535Z

Rocket.Chat is an open-source, secure, fully customizable communications platform. Prior to 8.5.1, 8.4.4, 8.3.6, 8.2.6, 8.1.6, 8.0.7, and 7.10.13, Rocket.Chat's Apple Sign-In handler verifies JWT signatures but skips claims validation. Any Apple-signed JWT with a non-empty iss is accepted regardless of aud, exp, nbf, or nonce. An attacker who obtains a target user's Apple identity token (from server logs, an intercepted sign-in flow, or another application sharing the same Apple developer team) can replay it to authenticate as that user, with no expiration on the replay window. This vulnerability is fixed in 8.5.1, 8.4.4, 8.3.6, 8.2.6, 8.1.6, 8.0.7, and 7.10.13.

Published: 2026-06-24T21:07:29.331Z
Updated: 2026-06-26T03:55:28.570Z

Rocket.Chat is an open-source, secure, fully customizable communications platform. Prior to 8.5.1, 8.4.4, 8.3.6, 8.2.6, 8.1.6, 8.0.7, and 7.10.13, in apps/meteor/app/apple/server/loginHandler.ts, handleIdentityToken parses a JWT issued by Apple during the OAuth flow. The try block checks for an email parameter. If the JWT does not contain an email address, the application falls back to accepting an arbitrary email value supplied directly in the request. Attackers are able to forge Apple JWTs that do not contain an email address and leverage this vulnerability to carry out account takeover attacks. This vulnerability is fixed in 8.5.1, 8.4.4, 8.3.6, 8.2.6, 8.1.6, 8.0.7, and 7.10.13.

Published: 2026-06-24T21:06:55.637Z
Updated: 2026-06-29T15:34:36.146Z