Matrix Android Sdk2

matrix-android-sdk2 is the Matrix SDK for Android. Prior to version 1.5.1, an attacker cooperating with a malicious homeserver can construct messages that legitimately appear to have come from another person, without any indication such as a grey shield. Additionally, a sophisticated attacker cooperating with a malicious homeserver could employ this vulnerability to perform a targeted attack in order to send fake to-device messages appearing to originate from another user. This can allow, for example, to inject the key backup secret during a self-verification, to make a targeted device start using a malicious key backup spoofed by the homeserver. matrix-android-sdk2 would then additionally sign such a key backup with its device key, spilling trust over to other devices trusting the matrix-android-sdk2 device. These attacks are possible due to a protocol confusion vulnerability that accepts to-device messages encrypted with Megolm instead of Olm. matrix-android-sdk2 version 1.5.1 has been modified to only accept Olm-encrypted to-device messages and to stop signing backups on a successful decryption. Out of caution, several other checks have been audited or added. This attack requires coordination between a malicious home server and an attacker, so those who trust their home servers do not need a workaround.

Published: 2022-09-28T20:05:12.000Z
Updated: 2025-04-23T16:54:40.093Z

matrix-android-sdk2 is the Matrix SDK for Android. Prior to version 1.5.1, an attacker cooperating with a malicious homeserver can construct messages appearing to have come from another person. Such messages will be marked with a grey shield on some platforms, but this may be missing in others. This attack is possible due to the key forwarding strategy implemented in the matrix-android-sdk2 that is too permissive. Starting with version 1.5.1, the default policy for accepting key forwards has been made more strict in the matrix-android-sdk2. The matrix-android-sdk2 will now only accept forwarded keys in response to previously issued requests and only from own, verified devices. The SDK now sets a `trusted` flag on the decrypted message upon decryption, based on whether the key used to decrypt the message was received from a trusted source. Clients need to ensure that messages decrypted with a key with `trusted = false` are decorated appropriately (for example, by showing a warning for such messages). As a workaroubnd, current users of the SDK can disable key forwarding in their forks using `CryptoService#enableKeyGossiping(enable: Boolean)`.

Published: 2022-09-28T20:00:19.000Z
Updated: 2025-04-23T16:54:47.328Z