Frontend Admin By Dynamiapps

The Frontend Admin by DynamiApps plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to authorization bypass in all versions up to, and including, 3.29.9. This is due to the plugin not properly verifying that a user is authorized to perform an action. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with subscriber-level and above permissions, to reset the password of any user on the site, including administrators, leading to full account takeover and complete site compromise. Exploitation requires the attacker to hold a valid encrypted Current-User token obtained by accessing any Edit User form they are legitimately authorized to submit, which they then use as a known-plaintext base for the CBC bit-flipping forgery.

Published: 2026-08-11T20:26:10.797Z
Updated: 2026-08-12T13:00:40.573Z

The Frontend Admin by DynamiApps plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass to Account Takeover in all versions up to, and including, 3.29.12. This is due to the pre_update_value function lacking any capability or ownership check, and ActionPost::conditions_logic() short-circuiting its current_user_can('edit_post') authorization gate whenever the post ID is non-numeric — such as the string user_1 — allowing unauthenticated form submissions to be routed to arbitrary user records without restriction. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to overwrite any user's registered email address, including an administrator's, and then leverage WordPress's native password-reset flow to fully take over the targeted account.

Published: 2026-09-06T02:26:52.017Z
Updated: 2026-09-07T11:17:23.174Z

The Frontend Admin by DynamiApps plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to authorization bypass in all versions up to, and including, 3.29.2. This is due to the plugin not properly verifying that a user is authorized to perform an action. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with subscriber-level access and above, to overwrite an administrator's user_pass, user_email, first_name, last_name, and other profile fields by supplying an arbitrary ?user_id= value, enabling full administrator account takeover via direct password replacement or email-redirect password reset. Exploitation requires the targeted Edit-User form to have its 'Roles' configuration setting left empty; when a non-empty roles list is configured, load_data() sets the user ID to 'none' for users whose roles fall outside the allowed list, preventing administrators from being targeted through that form.

Published: 2026-05-28T03:27:28.235Z
Updated: 2026-05-28T10:37:04.253Z

The Frontend Admin by DynamiApps plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation in versions up to and including 3.28.36. This is due to insufficient authorization checks in the role field update mechanism combined with overly permissive capabilities for the admin_form post type. The admin_form custom post type uses 'capability_type' => 'page', which grants editors the ability to create and edit forms. When an editor creates an edit_user form, they can manipulate the form configuration to include 'administrator' in the role_options array by directly submitting POST data to wp-admin/post.php, bypassing the UI restrictions in feadmin_get_user_roles(). When the form is subsequently submitted, the pre_update_value() function in class-role.php only validates that the submitted role exists in the form's role_options array (lines 107-110), but fails to verify that the current user has permission to assign that specific role. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to first register as editors (via a public new_user form), then create an edit_user form with administrator in the allowed roles, and finally use that form to escalate their own privileges to administrator.

Published: 2026-05-15T07:46:36.306Z
Updated: 2026-05-15T13:27:47.906Z

The Frontend Admin by DynamiApps plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthenticated privilege escalation in versions up to and including 3.29.2. This is due to insecure form submission handling that accepts arbitrary form definitions from user input instead of securely loading them from the backend. When $_POST['_acf_form'] is an array (rather than a form ID), the validate_form() function bypasses database lookup and directly processes the attacker-controlled structure. The create_record() function preserves attacker-supplied record data if present, and the user action's run() function falls back to attacker-controlled field definitions from $form['fields'] when legitimate fields cannot be found. The role field's pre_update_value() validation reads $field['role_options'] from this attacker-controlled definition, allowing an attacker to specify ['administrator'] as an allowed role and bypass the security check. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to create administrator accounts by injecting a custom form configuration with a spoofed role field.

Published: 2026-05-28T08:27:38.286Z
Updated: 2026-05-28T10:31:42.500Z