Neuvector

A vulnerability exists in NeuVector versions up to and including 5.4.5, where a fixed string is used as the default password for the built-in `admin` account. If this password is not changed immediately after deployment, any workload with network access within the cluster could use the default credentials to obtain an authentication token. This token can then be used to perform any operation via NeuVector APIs.

Published: 2025-09-17T12:33:37.904Z
Updated: 2026-02-26T17:48:28.400Z

NeuVector supports login authentication through OpenID Connect. However, the TLS verification (which verifies the remote server's authenticity and integrity) for OpenID Connect is not enforced by default. As a result this may expose the system to man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks.

Published: 2026-01-08T10:23:18.934Z
Updated: 2026-01-08T14:56:07.901Z

NeuVector used a hard-coded cryptographic key embedded in the source code. At compilation time, the key value was replaced with the secret key value and used to encrypt sensitive configurations when NeuVector stores the data.

Published: 2025-10-30T09:45:56.931Z
Updated: 2025-10-30T13:59:54.426Z

This vulnerability affects NeuVector deployments only when the Report anonymous cluster data option is enabled. When this option is enabled, NeuVector sends anonymous telemetry data to the telemetry server. In affected versions, NeuVector does not enforce TLS certificate verification when transmitting anonymous cluster data to the telemetry server. As a result, the communication channel is susceptible to man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks, where an attacker could intercept or modify the transmitted data. Additionally, NeuVector loads the response of the telemetry server is loaded into memory without size limitation, which makes it vulnerable to a Denial of Service(DoS) attack

Published: 2025-10-30T09:38:58.261Z
Updated: 2025-10-30T14:01:08.513Z

A vulnerability was identified in NeuVector, where the enforcer used environment variables CLUSTER_RPC_PORT and CLUSTER_LAN_PORT to generate a command to be executed via popen, without first sanitising their values. The entry process of the enforcer container is the monitor process. When the enforcer container stops, the monitor process checks whether the consul subprocess has exited. To perform this check, the monitor process uses the popen function to execute a shell command that determines whether the ports used by the consul subprocess are still active. The values of environment variables CLUSTER_RPC_PORT and CLUSTER_LAN_PORT are used directly to compose shell commands via popen without validation or sanitization. This behavior could allow a malicious user to inject malicious commands through these variables within the enforcer container.

Published: 2025-10-30T09:41:57.086Z
Updated: 2026-02-26T16:56:51.925Z