Dotcms Core

Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection') in the Publish Audit API endpoints (/api/auditPublishing/get and /api/auditPublishing/getAll) in dotCMS Core 25.11.04-1 through 26.04.28-02 allows remote unauthenticated attackers to read, modify, or destroy arbitrary database content. The endpoints did not enforce authentication and accepted unsanitized input used in dynamically constructed SQL. The fix in dotCMS Core 26.04.28-03 requires an authenticated backend user with the publishing-queue portlet permission. LTS releases are not affected as the vulnerable code path was never backported.

Published: 2026-05-27T07:55:25.905Z
Updated: 2026-05-27T13:40:13.159Z

In the System → Maintenance tool, the Logged Users tab surfaces sessionId data for all users via the Direct Web Remoting API (UserSessionAjax.getSessionList.dwr) calls. While this is information that would and should be available to admins who possess "Sign In As" powers, admins who otherwise lack this privilege would still be able to utilize the session IDs to imitate other users. While this is a very small attack vector that requires very high permissions to execute, its danger lies principally in obfuscating attribution; all Sign In As operations are attributed appropriately in the log files, and a malicious administrator could use this information to render their dealings untraceable — including those admins who have not been granted this ability — such as by using a session ID to generate an API token. Fixed in: 24.07.12 / 23.01.20 LTS / 23.10.24v13 LTS / 24.04.24v5 LTS This was the original found by researcher Zakaria Agharghar. 2. Later, on October 20, 2025, another researcher (Chris O’Neill) found additional affected DWR Endpoints that are vulnerable to Information Disclosure, namely and in addition to the original found of "UserSessionAjax.getSessionList.dwr - Session ID exposure": * UserAjax.getUsersList.dwr - Enumerate all users with IDs, names, emails * RoleAjax.getUserRole.dwr - Get user role information * RoleAjax.getRole.dwr - Get role details * RoleAjax.getRolePermissions.dwr - View role permissions * RoleAjax.isPermissionableInheriting.dwr - Check permission inheritance * RoleAjax.getCurrentCascadePermissionsJobs.dwr - View permission cascade jobs * ThreadMonitorTool.getThreads.dwr - Monitor system threads; and, * CRITICAL - Privilege Escalation: RoleAjax.saveRolePermission.dwr - Modify role permissions Overall CVSS for the above findings: * CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:L https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/3.1#CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:L * Score: 9.1 (Critical)

Published: 2024-07-26T02:02:32.506Z
Updated: 2026-02-24T08:47:24.879Z

The "reset password" login page accepted an HTML injection via URL parameters. This has already been rectified via patch, and as such it cannot be demonstrated via Demo site link. Those interested to see the vulnerability may spin up a http://localhost:8082/dotAdmin/#/public/login?resetEmailSent=true&resetEmail=%3Ch1%3E%3Ca%20href%3D%22https:%2F%2Fgoogle.com%22%3ECLICK%20ME%3C%2Fa%3E%3C%2Fh1%3E This will result in a view along these lines: * OWASP Top 10 - A03: Injection * CVSS Score: 5.4 * AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss/v3-calculator * https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss/v3-calculator?vector=AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N&... https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss/v3-calculator

Published: 2024-07-25T21:17:49.359Z
Updated: 2024-08-01T20:26:57.098Z

System->Maintenance-> Log Files in dotCMS dashboard is providing the username/password for database connections in the log output. Nevertheless, this is a moderate issue as it requires a backend admin as well as that dbs are locked down by environment.   OWASP Top 10 - A05) Insecure Design OWASP Top 10 - A05) Security Misconfiguration OWASP Top 10 - A09) Security Logging and Monitoring Failure

Published: 2024-04-01T21:38:04.085Z
Updated: 2024-09-30T15:27:54.804Z

In dotCMS dashboard, the Tools and Log Files tabs under System → Maintenance Portlet, which is and always has been an Admin portlet, is accessible to anyone with that portlet and not just to CMS Admins. Users that get site admin but not a system admin, should not have access to the System Maintenance → Tools portlet. This would share database username and password under Log Files and download DB Dump and other dotCMS Content under Tools. Nothing in the System → Maintenance should be displayed for users with site admin role. Only system admins must have access to System Maintenance. OWASP Top 10 - A01) Broken Access Control OWASP Top 10 - A04) Insecure Design

Published: 2024-04-01T21:27:51.580Z
Updated: 2024-09-30T15:30:31.887Z