Quinn

Quinn is a pure-Rust, async-compatible implementation of the IETF QUIC transport protocol. Starting in version 0.1.0 and prior to version 0.11.15, the `Assembler` component that assembles unordered stream fragments into consecutive chunks of the stream incurs some overhead for non-contiguous fragments. Readers that read from a `RecvStream` in order (through an `AsyncRead` impl for example) will be sensitive to peers that send fragments while leaving out early parts of the stream, and in particular, fragments with many gaps (because these cannot be defragmented). In such a scenario, the receiving connection suffers from high buffer overhead, enabling memory exhaustion. Version 0.11.15 fixes the issue.

Published: 2026-07-23T19:09:19.159Z
Updated: 2026-07-23T19:37:11.300Z

Quinn is a pure-Rust, async-compatible implementation of the IETF QUIC transport protocol. Prior to 0.11.14, a remote, unauthenticated attacker can trigger a denial of service in applications using vulnerable quinn versions by sending a crafted QUIC Initial packet containing malformed quic_transport_parameters. In quinn-proto parsing logic, attacker-controlled varints are decoded with unwrap(), so truncated encodings cause Err(UnexpectedEnd) and panic. This is reachable over the network with a single packet and no prior trust or authentication. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.11.14.

Published: 2026-03-10T21:04:36.812Z
Updated: 2026-08-25T12:05:46.656Z

Quinn is a pure-Rust, async-compatible implementation of the IETF QUIC transport protocol. As of quinn-proto 0.11, it is possible for a server to `accept()`, `retry()`, `refuse()`, or `ignore()` an `Incoming` connection. However, calling `retry()` on an unvalidated connection exposes the server to a likely panic in the following situations: 1. Calling `refuse` or `ignore` on the resulting validated connection, if a duplicate initial packet is received. This issue can go undetected until a server's `refuse()`/`ignore()` code path is exercised, such as to stop a denial of service attack. 2. Accepting when the initial packet for the resulting validated connection fails to decrypt or exhausts connection IDs, if a similar initial packet that successfully decrypts and doesn't exhaust connection IDs is received. This issue can go undetected if clients are well-behaved. The former situation was observed in a real application, while the latter is only theoretical.

Published: 2024-09-02T16:45:39.465Z
Updated: 2024-09-03T14:04:46.433Z

quinn-proto is a state machine for the QUIC transport protocol. Prior to versions 0.9.5 and 0.10.5, receiving unknown QUIC frames in a QUIC packet could result in a panic. The problem has been fixed in 0.9.5 and 0.10.5 maintenance releases.

Published: 2023-09-21T16:39:56.350Z
Updated: 2024-09-24T15:03:39.325Z