Anythingllm

A path traversal vulnerability exists in mintplex-labs/anything-llm versions up to and including 1.9.1, within the `AgentFlows` component. The vulnerability arises from improper handling of user input in the `loadFlow` and `deleteFlow` methods in `server/utils/agentFlows/index.js`. Specifically, the combination of `path.join` and `normalizePath` allows attackers to bypass directory restrictions and access or delete arbitrary `.json` files on the server. This can lead to information disclosure, such as leaking sensitive configuration files containing API keys, or denial of service by deleting critical files like `package.json`. The issue is resolved in version 1.12.1.

Published: 2026-04-07T13:06:38.503Z
Updated: 2026-04-07T13:52:59.055Z

AnythingLLM is an application that turns pieces of content into context that any LLM can use as references during chatting. Prior to version 1.12.1, GET /api/workspace/:slug/tts/:chatId in AnythingLLM returns the text-to-speech audio for another user's chat response within the same workspace because the route validates workspace membership but does not enforce ownership of the targeted chat row. As a result, an authenticated user can access another user's private assistant response in audio form if the chatId is known or guessed. This constitutes an insecure direct object reference (IDOR) affecting private chat response content exposed through the TTS endpoint. This issue has been patched in version 1.12.1.

Published: 2026-05-08T23:01:30.213Z
Updated: 2026-05-11T15:54:57.762Z

AnythingLLM is an application that turns pieces of content into context that any LLM can use as references during chatting. Prior to version 1.12.1, AnythingLLM's in-chat markdown renderer has an unsafe custom rule for images that interpolates the markdown image's `alt` text into an HTML `alt="..."` attribute without any HTML encoding. Every call-site in the app wraps `renderMarkdown(...)` with `DOMPurify.sanitize(...)` as defense-in-depth — except the `Chartable` component, which renders chart captions with no sanitization. The chart caption is the natural-language text the LLM emits around a `create-chart` tool call, so any attacker who can influence the LLM's output — most cheaply via indirect prompt injection in a shared workspace document, or directly if they can create a chart record in a multi-user workspace — can trigger stored DOM-level XSS in every other user's browser when they open that conversation. AnythingLLM chat history is loaded server-side via `GET /api/workspace/:slug/chats` and rendered directly into the chat UI. Version 1.12.1 contains a patch for this issue.

Published: 2026-04-24T02:57:16.193Z
Updated: 2026-04-24T18:17:42.185Z

AnythingLLM is an application that turns pieces of content into context that any LLM can use as references during chatting. In 1.11.1 and earlier, The ImportedPlugin.importCommunityItemFromUrl() function in server/utils/agents/imported.js downloads a ZIP file from a community hub URL and extracts it using AdmZip.extractAllTo() without validating file paths within the archive. This enables a Zip Slip path traversal attack that can lead to arbitrary code execution.

Published: 2026-03-13T21:25:31.682Z
Updated: 2026-03-16T16:44:38.247Z

AnythingLLM is an application that turns pieces of content into context that any LLM can use as references during chatting. In 1.11.1 and earlier, in multi-user mode, AnythingLLM blocks suspended users on the normal JWT-backed session path, but it does not block them on the browser extension API key path. If a user already has a valid brx-... browser extension API key, that key continues to work after suspension. As a result, a suspended user can still access browser extension endpoints, read reachable workspace metadata, and continue upload or embed operations even though normal authenticated requests are rejected.

Published: 2026-03-13T21:23:48.659Z
Updated: 2026-03-16T16:45:17.568Z