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cpe:2.3:a:sigstore:sigstore-python:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*

part: a version: * update: *

VendorSigstore (534c4401-0625-5be2-ae9b-f6c1539e71bc)
ProductSigstore Python (c913c7ae-3af9-54a4-b969-bf84afe374cd)
Edition*
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NotesImported from gcve-enriched-dumps CVE data

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Vulnerability references

IdentifiercpeApplicabilitySubmitteddb.gcve.eu detailsRationale
CVE:CVE-2026-24408 vulnerable 2026-06-08 07:51:17.644465 sigstore has CSRF possibility in OIDC authentication during signing
NONE
sigstore-python is a Python tool for generating and verifying Sigstore signatures. Prior to version 4.2.0, the sigstore-python OAuth authentication flow is susceptible to Cross-Site Request Forgery. `_OAuthSession` creates a unique "state" and sends it as a parameter in the authentication request but the "state" in the server response seems not not be cross-checked with this value. Version 4.2.0 contains a patch for the issue.
Published: 2026-01-26T22:21:35.047Z
Updated: 2026-01-27T21:35:14.119Z
Reference links
Imported from gcve-enriched-dumps CVE data
CVE:CVE-2024-55655 vulnerable 2026-06-08 06:54:17.162405 sigstore-python has insufficient validation of integration timestamp during verification
sigstore-python is a Python tool for generating and verifying Sigstore signatures. Versions of sigstore-python newer than 2.0.0 but prior to 3.6.0 perform insufficient validation of the "integration time" present in "v2" and "v3" bundles during the verification flow: the "integration time" is verified *if* a source of signed time (such as an inclusion promise) is present, but is otherwise trusted if no source of signed time is present. This does not affect "v1" bundles, as the "v1" bundle format always requires an inclusion promise. Sigstore uses signed time to support verification of signatures made against short-lived signing keys. The impact and severity of this weakness is *low*, as Sigstore contains multiple other enforcing components that prevent an attacker who modifies the integration timestamp within a bundle from impersonating a valid signature. In particular, an attacker who modifies the integration timestamp can induce a Denial of Service, but in no different manner than already possible with bundle access (e.g. modifying the signature itself such that it fails to verify). Separately, an attacker could upload a *new* entry to the transparency service, and substitute their new entry's time. However, this would still be rejected at validation time, as the new entry's (valid) signed time would be outside the validity window of the original signing certificate and would nonetheless render the attacker auditable.
Published: 2024-12-10T23:06:42.193Z
Updated: 2024-12-11T16:03:42.578Z
Reference links
Imported from gcve-enriched-dumps CVE data

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