Vvveb

Vvveb is a powerful and easy to use CMS with page builder to build websites, blogs or ecommerce stores. In versions 1.0.8.6 and prior, the nextRestore() and nextBackup() functions in the backup controller accept a file GET parameter and concatenate it directly to DIR_BACKUP without calling sanitizeFileName(). This allows an authenticated administrator to read arbitrary files on the server (via nextRestore) and write SQL dump content to arbitrary locations (via nextBackup). This is inconsistent with the sibling functions restore(), delete(), and download() which all correctly call sanitizeFileName() first. This issue has been patched via commit aa29cb0.

Published: 2026-10-23T11:45:55.139Z
Updated: 2026-10-29T02:49:35.598Z

Vvveb is a powerful and easy to use CMS with page builder to build websites, blogs or ecommerce stores. Prior to 1.0.8.5, app/controller/user/profile.php accepts the user[bio] field and passes stored content through sanitizeHTML() in system/functions.php, whose on* event-handler regular expression omits the forward-slash delimiter and whose do-while condition compares the string to itself, so forbidden nested tags are removed only once. An Author-role or higher user can submit solidus-prefixed event-handler markup or nested forbidden tags that survive sanitization. The stored bio is rendered without sufficient output encoding on /author/{username}, in the admin user-management view, and potentially in comment displays, causing attacker-controlled JavaScript to execute when unauthenticated visitors, administrators, or other users view the content. This can expose browser-session data and permit victim-context account actions, defacement, or phishing. This issue is fixed in version 1.0.8.5.

Published: 2026-09-17T21:47:20.530Z
Updated: 2026-09-23T19:09:21.053Z

Vvveb is a powerful and easy to use CMS with page builder to build websites, blogs or ecommerce stores. Prior to 1.0.8.5, the oEmbedProxy() handler in admin/controller/editor/editor.php accepts an attacker-controlled url parameter and passes it to getUrl(), while validateUrl() in system/functions.php checks only the hostname string and does not validate its resolved addresses. An authenticated admin-panel user with editor/* permission can invoke GET /admin/index.php?module=editor/editor&action=oEmbedProxy with a dotted hostname or normalized loopback form that resolves to a private, loopback, link-local, or reserved address, causing the server to issue an HTTP or HTTPS request and return the response body. Storefront users and anonymous visitors cannot invoke the endpoint, but no CSRF token is required because the action uses GET. This can disclose internal service responses or cloud instance metadata and associated credentials. This issue is fixed in version 1.0.8.5.

Published: 2026-09-17T21:44:47.699Z
Updated: 2026-09-18T14:43:10.025Z

Vvveb is a powerful and easy to use CMS with page builder to build websites, blogs or ecommerce stores. Prior to 1.0.8.5, getThemeFolder() in admin/controller/editor/revisions.php returns the attacker-controlled theme parameter without sanitization, and backupFolder() concatenates it beneath DIR_THEMES before editor/revisions/load or editor/revisions/delete operates on a named .html file. sanitizeBackupFileName() strips traversal characters only from the separate file parameter and does not protect the theme directory component. An authenticated user with the default Editor role and editor/* permission can submit traversal sequences that redirect file_get_contents() or unlink() to a reachable backup subdirectory outside the web root. A valid admin session and CSRF token are required, the read is limited to .html files in backup directories, and deletion additionally requires filesystem write permission. This can disclose sensitive exported site content or remove backup data. This issue is fixed in version 1.0.8.5.

Published: 2026-09-17T21:45:32.239Z
Updated: 2026-09-22T01:55:30.837Z

Vvveb is a powerful and easy to use CMS with page builder to build websites, blogs or ecommerce stores. From 1.0.0 until 1.0.8.5, saveGlobalElements() in admin/controller/editor/global-trait.php concatenates the attacker-controlled file portion of data-v-save-global to the active theme directory before loadHTMLFile() and file_put_contents() operate on it. An authenticated user with the default Editor role and editor/* permission can submit crafted HTML to module=editor/editor&action=save and traverse to an existing writable PHP file outside the theme directory. If the target is web-accessible, editor-controlled PHP content executes in the web server context; a shipped public/vadmin/index.php entrypoint can be used as an execution trampoline rather than requiring a test-only file. This can permit persistent webshell placement and compromise application confidentiality, integrity, and availability. This issue is fixed in version 1.0.8.5.

Published: 2026-09-17T21:46:27.346Z
Updated: 2026-09-18T20:04:55.345Z