Recipes

Tandoor Recipes before 2.7.0 contains a server-side request forgery vulnerability in the Pestle importer that allows authenticated low-privileged users to force the server to issue GET requests to arbitrary internal or external hosts by crafting a malicious image URL in a Pestle JSON import file. Attackers can exploit the raw requests.get call in cookbook/integration/pestle.py, which bypasses the application's centralized requests-hardened SSRF filter, to reach internal-only endpoints, perform port/service discovery, and exfiltrate internal responses via the stored recipe image.

Published: 2026-10-23T16:12:12.359Z
Updated: 2026-11-08T14:00:59.118Z

Tandoor Recipes is an application for managing recipes, planning meals, and building shopping lists. Prior to 2.6.10, passes an administrator-controlled AI provider URL directly to LiteLLM without applying the server's outbound-request SSRF checks when an authenticated user creates a Space, configures an AI provider with a URL targeting an internal address, and invokes an AI action. In cookbook/views/api.py, the affected AI actions call completion through TARGET/api/ai-import/ and api/ai-step-sort/ while bypassing safe_request. The attack works because the server connects to the supplied provider URL from each AI action and exposes connection success, refusal, or timeout as a blind network-reachability oracle. This can reach internal services, other hosts on the server network, and cloud metadata endpoints and map reachable internal hosts and ports. This issue is fixed in version 2.6.10.

Published: 2026-10-16T19:21:07.358Z
Updated: 2026-10-21T21:26:53.503Z

Tandoor Recipes is an application for managing recipes, planning meals, and building shopping lists. Prior to 2.6.10, executes user-controlled Automation regular-expression patterns with Python re.sub() without complexity validation or an execution timeout when an authenticated user stores a catastrophic-backtracking regex and any user in the same Space imports a matching recipe. Request processing uses Automation.param_2, apply_regex_replace_automation, sub, api/recipe-from-source/. The attack works because the shared-Space automation engine evaluates the malicious pattern during recipe import and can occupy a Gunicorn worker until its request timeout. This can exhaust application worker slots and make the service unavailable to users. This issue is fixed in version 2.6.10.

Published: 2026-10-16T19:18:57.453Z
Updated: 2026-10-16T19:40:13.402Z

Tandoor Recipes is an application for managing recipes, planning meals, and building shopping lists. Prior to 2.6.10, looks up BookmarkletImport by sequential primary key within the active Space without restricting created_by to the requesting user when an authenticated member of a shared Space submits another member's pending bookmarklet identifier to POST /api/recipe-from-source/. Request processing uses api/recipe-from-source/, BookmarkletImport, filter, delete. The attack works because the endpoint parses and returns the victim's stored URL and captured page content, then unconditionally deletes the victim's pending import. This can disclose authenticated or private captured page content and destroy another Space member's pending import. This issue is fixed in version 2.6.10.

Published: 2026-10-16T16:51:54.639Z
Updated: 2026-10-19T12:47:26.855Z

Tandoor Recipes is an application for managing recipes, planning meals, and building shopping lists. Prior to 2.6.4, the POST /api/food/{id}/shopping/ endpoint reads amount and unit directly from request.data and passes them without validation to ShoppingListEntry.objects.create(). Invalid amount values (non-numeric strings) cause an unhandled exception and HTTP 500. A unit ID from a different Space can be associated cross-space, leaking foreign-key references across tenant boundaries. All other endpoints creating ShoppingListEntry use ShoppingListEntrySerializer, which validates and sanitizes these fields. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.6.4.

Published: 2026-04-07T14:53:18.333Z
Updated: 2026-04-07T15:58:45.810Z