Eg4 Flex 18

The affected product allows firmware updates to be downloaded from EG4's website, transferred via USB dongles, or installed through EG4's Monitoring Center (remote, cloud-connected interface) or via a serial connection, and can install these files without integrity checks. The TTComp archive format used for the firmware is unencrypted and can be unpacked and altered without detection.

Published: 2025-08-08T16:09:02.072Z
Updated: 2025-08-08T19:12:44.942Z

The MOD3 command traffic between the monitoring application and the inverter is transmitted in plaintext without encryption or obfuscation. This vulnerability may allow an attacker with access to a local network to intercept, manipulate, replay, or forge critical data, including read/write operations for voltage, current, and power configuration, operational status, alarms, telemetry, system reset, or inverter control commands, potentially disrupting power generation or reconfiguring inverter settings.

Published: 2025-08-08T16:00:43.694Z
Updated: 2025-09-08T17:06:06.953Z

The public-facing product registration endpoint server responds differently depending on whether the S/N is valid and unregistered, valid but already registered, or does not exist in the database. Combined with the fact that serial numbers are sequentially assigned, this allows an attacker to gain information on the product registration status of different S/Ns.

Published: 2025-08-08T16:14:18.901Z
Updated: 2025-08-08T19:13:18.978Z

The affected product does not limit the number of attempts for inputting the correct PIN for a registered product, which may allow an attacker to gain unauthorized access using brute-force methods if they possess a valid device serial number. The API provides clear feedback when the correct PIN is entered. This vulnerability was patched in a server-side update on April 6, 2025.

Published: 2025-08-08T16:17:43.727Z
Updated: 2025-08-08T19:13:44.835Z