E Mobi.Hu

Charging station authentication identifiers are publicly accessible via web-based mapping platforms.

Published: 2026-03-06T15:09:22.057Z
Updated: 2026-03-12T15:54:09.223Z

The WebSocket backend uses charging station identifiers to uniquely associate sessions but allows multiple endpoints to connect using the same session identifier. This implementation results in predictable session identifiers and enables session hijacking or shadowing, where the most recent connection displaces the legitimate charging station and receives backend commands intended for that station. This vulnerability may allow unauthorized users to authenticate as other users or enable a malicious actor to cause a denial-of-service condition by overwhelming the backend with valid session requests.

Published: 2026-03-06T15:07:32.848Z
Updated: 2026-03-10T17:59:28.839Z

WebSocket endpoints lack proper authentication mechanisms, enabling attackers to perform unauthorized station impersonation and manipulate data sent to the backend. An unauthenticated attacker can connect to the OCPP WebSocket endpoint using a known or discovered charging station identifier, then issue or receive OCPP commands as a legitimate charger. Given that no authentication is required, this can lead to privilege escalation, unauthorized control of charging infrastructure, and corruption of charging network data reported to the backend.

Published: 2026-03-06T15:03:03.668Z
Updated: 2026-03-09T15:21:58.096Z

The WebSocket Application Programming Interface lacks restrictions on the number of authentication requests. This absence of rate limiting may allow an attacker to conduct denial-of-service attacks by suppressing or mis-routing legitimate charger telemetry, or conduct brute-force attacks to gain unauthorized access.

Published: 2026-03-06T15:05:42.589Z
Updated: 2026-03-10T17:59:37.339Z