Copilot Cli

GitHub Copilot CLI brings AI-powered coding assistance directly to your command line. Prior to 1.0.43, a security vulnerability has been identified in GitHub Copilot CLI where a malicious bare git repository nested inside a project directory can achieve arbitrary code execution when the agent performs git operations. By exploiting git's automatic bare repository discovery during directory traversal, an attacker can set core.fsmonitor or other executable config keys to run arbitrary commands without user awareness or approval. The vulnerability arises because git's core.fsmonitor config key (and 15+ similar keys such as core.hookspath, diff.external, merge.tool, etc.) can specify arbitrary shell commands that git will execute as part of normal operations like status, diff, or rev-parse. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.0.43.

Published: 2026-05-13T15:45:26.751Z
Updated: 2026-05-13T18:38:57.370Z

The shell tool within GitHub Copilot CLI versions prior to and including 0.0.422 can allow arbitrary code execution through crafted bash parameter expansion patterns. An attacker who can influence the commands executed by the agent (e.g., via prompt injection through repository files, MCP server responses, or user instructions) can exploit bash parameter transformation operators to execute hidden commands, bypassing the safety assessment that classifies commands as "read-only." This has been patched in version 0.0.423. The vulnerability stems from how the CLI's shell safety assessment evaluates commands before execution. The safety layer parses and classifies shell commands as either read-only (safe) or write-capable (requires user approval). However, several bash parameter expansion features can embed executable code within arguments to otherwise read-only commands, causing them to appear safe while actually performing arbitrary operations. The specific dangerous patterns are ${var@P}, ${var=value} / ${var:=value}, ${!var}, and nested $(cmd) or <(cmd) inside ${...} expansions. An attacker who can influence command text sent to the shell tool - for example, through prompt injection via malicious repository content (README files, code comments, issue bodies), compromised or malicious MCP server responses, or crafted user instructions containing obfuscated commands - could achieve arbitrary code execution on the user's workstation. This is possible even in permission modes that require user approval for write operations, since the commands can appear to use only read-only utilities to ultimately trigger write operations. Successful exploitation could lead to data exfiltration, file modification, or further system compromise.

Published: 2026-03-06T16:39:27.424Z
Updated: 2026-03-11T03:56:38.092Z