Arcadedb

ArcadeDB (Maven artifact com.arcadedb:arcadedb-engine) through 26.8.1 enforces its per-type/per-record access-control rules only in LocalBucket, keyed on file id. Query-execution paths that reach record data through LSM index files or the TimeSeries engine never invoke that permission check, so an authenticated user who is denied readRecord/deleteRecord on a type can still, with a single ordinary SQL statement, read the type's indexed key values and record IDs (e.g. SELECT key, rid FROM INDEX:Type[field]), read MAX/MIN values via the index shortcut, read and count TimeSeries samples, learn the type's record count, and delete index entries (DELETE FROM INDEX:Type[field]), which desynchronizes the index from the data and can defeat unique constraints. Index and type names needed for exploitation are discoverable because SELECT FROM schema:indexes is unfiltered. The issue affects both embedded and server deployments and all transports (HTTP, Bolt, Postgres, Gremlin) once a principal is bound. Fixed in 26.9.1.

Published: 2026-09-18T13:20:06.730Z
Updated: 2026-09-18T14:32:33.083Z

ArcadeDB before 26.9.1 contains an access control bypass vulnerability in the query_database tool exposed through the AI chat endpoints. The tool executes queries without binding the authenticated principal to DatabaseContext, causing per-type and per-bucket ACL checks to silently no-op and allowing authenticated users to read data they are explicitly denied at the per-type level. Attackers can prompt the AI assistant to execute queries against restricted types or buckets to retrieve sensitive data that would be rejected through normal query endpoints.

Published: 2026-09-18T13:20:07.472Z
Updated: 2026-09-21T20:52:08.205Z

ArcadeDB versions before 26.9.1 fail to validate IPv6 transition addresses in the SSRF guard used by IMPORT DATABASE and server commands. Authenticated attackers can supply URLs resolving to NAT64, 6to4, or Teredo addresses embedding RFC 1918 or loopback IPv4 payloads to reach internal services and cloud metadata endpoints.

Published: 2026-09-18T13:20:08.858Z
Updated: 2026-09-18T17:55:31.339Z

ArcadeDB before 26.9.1 fails to enforce security-group types ACL entries for TimeSeries types because the ACL resolver builds permissions from bucket IDs, but TimeSeries types do not own normal record buckets. An authenticated low-privilege user can read or insert TimeSeries samples despite explicit deny rules by exploiting the missing type-name-based access check that causes permission lookups to fail open.

Published: 2026-09-18T13:20:06.052Z
Updated: 2026-09-22T14:21:01.126Z

ArcadeDB versions before 26.7.3 fail to bind the authenticated principal in the MCP HTTP transport, causing all engine permission checks to silently pass as no-ops. Non-root MCP-allowed users can perform arbitrary database writes, DDL, schema mutations, and execute arbitrary JavaScript code via the query tool.

Published: 2026-08-02T12:15:25.820Z
Updated: 2026-08-03T15:44:10.206Z