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cpe:2.3:a:microsoft:apm:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*

part: a version: * update: *

VendorMicrosoft (67206627-3ef6-5870-9d98-26a9f2e7065c)
ProductApm (d4643e5f-cc28-53c2-88d9-3a90ed429a25)
Edition*
Language*
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NotesImported from gcve-enriched-dumps CVE data

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Vulnerability references

IdentifiercpeApplicabilitySubmitteddb.gcve.eu detailsRationale
CVE:CVE-2026-46383 vulnerable 2026-06-08 08:05:12.055964 Microsoft APM: Windows absolute-path tar member overwrite during legacy-bundle probing in `apm install`
MEDIUM (5.5)
Microsoft APM is an open-source, community-driven dependency manager for AI agents. Prior to 0.13.0, Microsoft APM contains a Windows-specific archive extraction boundary failure in the legacy-bundle probe used by apm install <bundle> on supported Python 3.10 and 3.11 runtimes. When apm install is given a local .tar.gz that is not recognized as a plugin-format bundle, APM probes whether it is a legacy --format apm bundle. On Python versions earlier than 3.12, that probe extracts untrusted tar members with raw tar.extractall() without rejecting Windows absolute member names such as D:/.... This vulnerability is fixed in 0.13.0.
Published: 2026-05-15T16:04:24.050Z
Updated: 2026-05-15T17:49:11.229Z
Reference links
Imported from gcve-enriched-dumps CVE data
CVE:CVE-2026-45539 vulnerable 2026-06-08 08:05:11.781376 Microsoft APM: Symlinks under `.apm/prompts/` and `.apm/agents/` are dereferenced during `apm install`, copying host-local file contents into the project tree
HIGH (7.4)
Microsoft APM is an open-source, community-driven dependency manager for AI agents. From 0.5.4 to 0.12.4, two primitive integrators in apm-cli enumerate package files with bare Path.glob() / Path.rglob() calls and read each match with Path.read_text(), transparently following symbolic links. A symlink committed inside a remote APM dependency under .apm/prompts/<x>.prompt.md or .apm/agents/<x>.agent.md is preserved verbatim into apm_modules/ on clone and then dereferenced during integration, with the resolved content written as a regular file into the project's deploy directories. The package content_hash, the pre-deploy SecurityGate scan, and apm audit do not flag this. The deploy roots are not added to the auto-generated .gitignore, so the resulting files are staged by git add by default. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.13.0.
Published: 2026-05-15T16:02:37.591Z
Updated: 2026-05-15T16:41:24.808Z
Reference links
Imported from gcve-enriched-dumps CVE data
CVE:CVE-2026-44641 vulnerable 2026-06-08 08:05:11.230268 Microsoft APM: plugin.json component paths escape plugin root and copy arbitrary host files during install
HIGH (7.1)
Microsoft APM is an open-source, community-driven dependency manager for AI agents. Prior to 0.8.12, Microsoft APM normalizes marketplace plugins by copying plugin components referenced in plugin.json into .apm/. The manifest fields agents, skills, commands, and hooks are attacker-controlled, but the implementation does not enforce that those paths remain inside the plugin directory. A malicious plugin can therefore use absolute paths or ../ traversal paths to copy arbitrary readable host files or directories from the installer's machine during apm install. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.8.12.
Published: 2026-05-15T16:00:23.198Z
Updated: 2026-05-15T17:49:00.985Z
Reference links
Imported from gcve-enriched-dumps CVE data

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