Klever Go

Klever-Go is the Go implementation of the Klever blockchain protocol. Prior to 1.7.18, the P2P resolver request handling logic is vulnerable to hash-array amplification. A connected peer can send a compressed RequestDataType_HashArrayType direct request that is only 442 bytes on the wire but expands into 200,000 decoded hash entries inside the resolver path. The resolver's antiflood logic counts only a single logical message and the compressed wire size, and while Batch.Decompress() caps the decompressed byte size, it never limits the number of decoded repeated-field items. As a result, both TxResolver and TrieNodeResolver preallocate and iterate over the entire unchecked set of decoded hashes, causing remote memory and CPU amplification against any node that accepts P2P peer connections. This issue is fixed in version 1.7.18.

Published: 2026-08-07T22:09:03.931Z
Updated: 2026-08-10T14:07:38.266Z

Klever-Go is the Go implementation of the Klever blockchain protocol. Versions from 1.7.14 through 1.7.17 are vulnerable to a remotely triggerable denial of service. Both REST APIs are started with the Gin Engine.Run convenience method, which serves requests through Go's default HTTP server with no ReadHeaderTimeout, ReadTimeout, or MaxHeaderBytes configured. As a result, incoming connections that never complete their request headers are held open indefinitely. When a REST listener is reachable beyond localhost through the documented all-interface bind or a Docker port-publish deployment, a single unauthenticated client can open many slow-header connections and hold them open until server file descriptors are exhausted, preventing the API from accepting new connections. This renders the REST API unavailable to legitimate clients. This issue is fixed in version 1.7.18.

Published: 2026-08-07T22:53:41.291Z
Updated: 2026-08-11T01:22:30.059Z

Klever-Go is the Go implementation of the Klever blockchain protocol. In versions 1.7.14 through 1.7.17, the direct-message ingress handler spawns a new goroutine for every incoming direct message before the processor-level antiflood layer makes any admission decision, with no semaphore, throttler, or bound on the number of concurrent in-flight spawns. Because the antiflood check runs inside the spawned goroutine rather than before it, a single connected peer can open a direct-send stream and send a stream of well-formed messages to force unbounded goroutine creation, where each goroutine allocates its own stack and holds a message reference until processing completes, adding scheduler and garbage-collection pressure faster than the runtime can drain it. This lets one peer degrade the node's availability and its ability to process legitimate traffic, resulting in a remotely triggerable denial of service. The issue is fixed in 1.7.18.

Published: 2026-08-07T22:36:53.980Z
Updated: 2026-08-10T13:36:07.695Z

Klever-Go is the Go implementation of the Klever blockchain protocol. Versions 1.7.14 through 1.7.17 are vulnerable to a nil-pointer panic triggered by a protobuf Transaction whose embedded RawData sub-message is omitted. This omission causes RawData to decode to nil. Every transaction gossiped on the Klever-Go P2P network is decoded and validated synchronously inside the libp2p pubsub topic-validator callback, where txVersionChecker.CheckTxVersion dereferences tx.RawData.Version with no nil check. Because the libp2p pubsub callback, the underlying go-libp2p-pubsub validation worker, and Klever's own network/p2p layer install no recover(), the panic propagates and crashes the entire node process. The attacker payload is a 3-byte protobuf message; no validator key, stake, funds, or on-chain account is required, and delivery aimed at enough of the BLS validator set can halt block production, resulting in a chain halt. This issue has been fixed in version 1.7.18.

Published: 2026-08-07T22:32:27.340Z
Updated: 2026-08-10T14:16:48.518Z

Klever-Go is the Go implementation of the Klever blockchain protocol. In versions prior to 1.7.18, the account-data trie syncers are vulnerable to a resource-exhaustion flaw that leaks bounded throttler slots on error paths. In syncDataTrie() (in both userAccountsSyncer.go and kappAccountsSyncer.go), StartProcessing() reserves a slot from the NumGoRoutinesThrottler, but the corresponding EndProcessing() is only called on the success path and on the duplicate-root early return. As a result, any error from trie.NewTrie(), trie.NewTrieSyncer(), or trieSyncer.StartSyncing() (including the network-dependent timeout path) permanently consumes one slot for the lifetime of the throttler. An attacker who can repeatedly cause trie-node sync failures or timeouts during bootstrap can exhaust the bounded throttler, after which further account-data trie syncs stop making progress and SyncAccounts() returns a timeout. Because epoch bootstrap in syncUserAccountsState() and syncKappAccountsState() aborts on any such error, this causes bootstrap to fail, a core availability issue affecting fresh, restarting, or resyncing nodes and validators. This issue is fixed in version 1.7.18.

Published: 2026-08-07T22:18:18.735Z
Updated: 2026-08-13T18:40:16.330Z