Epa4All Client

epa4all-client is the Java Client for epa4all / ePA 3.0 in the Telematik Infrastruktur. Prior to 1.2.2, an attacker who can MITM the TLS connection between the client and the IDP (within the TI network) can substitute a forged discovery document. The forged document redirects uri_puk_idp_enc and uri_puk_idp_sig to attacker-controlled URLs. The client then encrypts the SMC-B-signed challenge response to the attacker's encryption key and POSTs it to the attacker's auth endpoint. This captures the signed authentication material. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.2.2.

Published: 2026-05-26T21:01:51.745Z
Updated: 2026-05-28T14:11:30.565Z

epa4all-client is the Java Client for epa4all / ePA 3.0 in the Telematik Infrastruktur. Prior to 1.2.2, an attacker on the network path between the ePA service and the Konnektor can present any TLS certificate (self-signed, expired, wrong CN) and intercept all SOAP traffic. This includes patient identifiers (KVNR), SMC-B card operations (authentication, signing), document content, and credential exchanges. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.2.2.

Published: 2026-05-26T21:03:15.152Z
Updated: 2026-05-27T13:21:07.023Z

epa4all-client is the Java Client for epa4all / ePA 3.0 in the Telematik Infrastruktur. Prior to 1.2.1, in SignedPublicKeysTrustValidatorImpl.isTrusted(), the ECDSA signature verification at line 45 discards the boolean return value of Signature.verify(). The method performs certificate chain validation, OCSP check, and signature algorithm setup, but never checks whether the signature actually matches. For any structurally valid signature, it returns true. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.2.1.

Published: 2026-05-26T21:04:53.961Z
Updated: 2026-05-28T14:12:28.907Z