Langflow Oss

IBM Langflow OSS 1.0.0 through 1.10.0 can allow attackers to execute arbitrary Python code with root privileges (UID=0) on the Langflow server by submitting components containing socket or urllib imports. This enables: (1) AWS credential theft via IMDSv1 SSRF with full IAM role permissions, (2) arbitrary file exfiltration from the container filesystem, and (3) lateral movement to internal services (PostgreSQL, Redis) within the Docker network. The scanner incorrectly returns "validated": true, providing a false security signal.

Published: 2026-09-14T21:30:58.290Z
Updated: 2026-09-16T03:56:13.581Z

IBM Langflow OSS 1.0.0 through 1.10.0 could allow a remote attacker to inject arbitrary code on the system, due to the improper control of user input code.

Published: 2026-07-30T19:01:50.960Z
Updated: 2026-07-31T03:56:19.395Z

IBM Langflow OSS 1.0.0 through 1.10.0 allows unauthenticated attackers to create unlimited user accounts on any Langflow instance; when NEW_USER_IS_ACTIVE=true (documented deployment option), newly created accounts are immediately active and can authenticate to reach RCE endpoints, bypassing the need for AUTO_LOGIN.

Published: 2026-07-17T17:33:20.083Z
Updated: 2026-07-18T03:55:39.032Z

IBM Langflow OSS 1.0.0 through 1.10.0 allows unauthenticated attackers to chain /api/v1/auto_login (mints SUPERUSER tokens to any network caller) with /api/v1/validate/code (executes user code via exec()) to achieve full RCE on default Langflow deployments

Published: 2026-07-17T17:36:11.246Z
Updated: 2026-08-17T19:10:55.374Z

IBM Langflow OSS 1.0.0 through 1.10.0 Langflow versions up to 1.9.2 (commit 94981c443d4918517b9e8163d70fc598dc33a32d) contain a code injection vulnerability in the Policies component's ToolGuard integration that bypasses the allow_custom_components=false security control. The vulnerability exists because the validation mechanism only checks the main component source code in node_template["code"]["value"] but fails to validate dynamic CodeInput fields that store generated ToolGuard Python files. Attackers can embed malicious Python code in these unvalidated dynamic fields, which are persisted in Flow.data and later executed server-side when a guarded tool is invoked through the ToolGuard runtime. This allows authenticated users with flow creation privileges to achieve arbitrary Python code execution on the backend despite custom component restrictions. The vulnerability can be escalated through cross-tenant flow manipulation via the agentic MCP update_flow_component_field tool, which accepts attacker-controlled user_id parameters, enabling attackers to inject malicious code into victim users' flows. When combined with publicly accessible flows and specific misconfigurations (AUTO_LOGIN=true, NEW_USER_IS_ACTIVE=true), the attack can be conducted with reduced authentication requirements.

Published: 2026-07-17T18:48:55.949Z
Updated: 2026-07-23T03:56:03.838Z