Activepieces

Activepieces is an open source AI workflow automation platform. Prior to 0.83.0, the /api/redirect OAuth callback endpoint embeds the user-supplied code query parameter directly into an inline script block without proper escaping. A crafted request to /api/redirect with a malicious code value can break out of the script context and execute arbitrary JavaScript in the Activepieces origin when a logged-in user opens it. An unauthenticated attacker can access the victim's session tokens or make authenticated API calls on the victim's behalf. This issue is fixed in version 0.83.0.

Published: 2026-08-11T16:35:06.492Z
Updated: 2026-08-12T22:13:48.236Z

Activepieces is an open source AI workflow automation platform. Prior to 0.84.0, an unsanitized path segment in the Code piece sandbox can let an authenticated flow author reach read-write cached flow and code files belonging to other tenants on the same worker, exposing embedded data and allowing modified code to execute on a victim tenant's next flow run. This issue is fixed in version 0.84.0.

Published: 2026-07-30T17:10:28.347Z
Updated: 2026-07-30T18:07:34.332Z

Activepieces is an open source AI workflow automation platform. Prior to 0.83.0, the /v1/step-files/signed download endpoint verified the supplied JWT against the shared signing secret but did not check the token's audience, and combined with a missing null-check on the decoded fileId, this allowed any caller holding any valid Activepieces JWT (including a freshly created user's own access token) to receive a step-file belonging to another tenant. The file returned was whatever PostgreSQL happened to scan first for type = FLOW_STEP_FILE, varying over time as the database changed, so an authenticated user could obtain step-file attachments belonging to other tenants on the same instance; the attacker could not target a specific victim or file, and the access was read-only with no integrity or availability impact. This issue is fixed in version 0.83.0.

Published: 2026-07-16T18:48:30.875Z
Updated: 2026-07-18T03:06:51.360Z

Activepieces is an open source AI workflow automation platform. Prior to 0.82.0, the git-sync feature clones a user-configured Git repository into a temporary directory on the server and then writes flow, table, and connection state into it before pushing back, and two separate weaknesses allowed those writes to escape the intended workspace and land on arbitrary paths on the host filesystem: Git's symbolic-link handling was not disabled on the clone, so an attacker who controlled the remote repository could include symlinks that redirected the writes, and several user-supplied identifiers used to build on-disk paths (the repository slug and the externalId of tables, flows, and connections) were not validated against directory-traversal sequences such as ../. On a self-hosted Enterprise Edition deployment, a user authorized to configure or push to a git-sync repository (holding the WRITE_PROJECT_RELEASE permission) could cause the server to overwrite files anywhere the Activepieces process user can write, which depending on host layout can be leveraged for tampering, denial of service, or remote code execution. This issue is fixed in version 0.82.0.

Published: 2026-07-16T18:52:43.462Z
Updated: 2026-07-17T18:06:44.807Z

A vulnerability was detected in activepieces up to 0.83.0. This vulnerability affects the function handleUrlFile in the library packages/server/engine/src/lib/variables/processors/file.ts of the component File URL Handler. The manipulation results in server-side request forgery. The attack can be executed remotely. The exploit is now public and may be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.

Published: 2026-06-21T22:30:09.414Z
Updated: 2026-06-22T13:24:34.047Z