V720

The Naxclow platform exposes a registration endpoint that accepts signed requests containing a batch prefix and an arbitrary caller-supplied account identifier, without validating any ownership relationship. Each call mints a new sequential device identifier and returns the current high-water counter value for the batch, allowing callers to measure and enumerate the active device space. The endpoint’s behavior enables precise fleet enumeration.

Published: 2026-06-12T18:21:25.834Z
Updated: 2026-06-12T19:00:11.857Z

The Naxclow platform API that returns device relay registration details exposes a persistent credential without verifying that the requester is the legitimate device or owner. An actor able to present a platform-valid request signature can retrieve credentials for arbitrary devices and register on the relay as that device, enabling interception and disruption of its communications.

Published: 2026-06-12T18:10:54.744Z
Updated: 2026-06-12T19:01:28.533Z

Naxclow devices use a server-side, per-device relay credential that never rotates and is re-issued to the device on each boot. Because this credential remains valid indefinitely and cannot be reset or revoked by the legitimate owner, any party that obtains it through any exposure path can maintain persistent access to the device’s relay channel. This enables long-term impersonation or interception, even after factory resets or re-onboarding.

Published: 2026-06-12T18:07:37.195Z
Updated: 2026-06-12T19:01:57.435Z

During WiFi association, Naxclow device firmware prints the host network’s SSID, PSK, and negotiated WPA keys in cleartext to an exposed UART console on production hardware. The UART pads are labeled, run with default serial settings, and drop to an interactive RT-Thread shell that permits arbitrary memory reads, enabling full firmware extraction. An attacker with brief physical access, common for outdoor-mounted devices, can therefore recover WiFi credentials and bootstrap firmware-side attacks.

Published: 2026-06-12T18:24:14.760Z
Updated: 2026-06-12T18:58:23.718Z

A flaw in Naxclow's platform’s onboarding workflow allows an attacker to replay a confirm-then-bind sequence to silently reassign a device to an arbitrary account. Because the affected endpoints validate request signatures but do not confirm legitimate ownership, an attacker with any account can take over a device without user interaction while the device remains online and unaware.

Published: 2026-06-12T18:13:41.828Z
Updated: 2026-06-12T19:01:00.652Z