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cpe:2.3:a:duck-organization:duck-site:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
part: a version: * update: *
| Vendor | Duck Organization (2e74bddb-8d56-5340-9083-f9e710d816bb) |
|---|---|
| Product | Duck Site (6facde52-64c5-50a2-9347-031c04ad67cc) |
| Edition | * |
| Language | * |
| Software edition | * |
| Target software | * |
| Target hardware | * |
| Other | * |
| Notes | Imported from gcve-enriched-dumps CVE data |
PURL mappings
| PURL | Source | Last updated |
|---|---|---|
| No PURL mappings for this CPE yet. | ||
Vulnerability references
| Identifier | cpeApplicability | Submitted | db.gcve.eu details | Rationale |
|---|---|---|---|---|
CVE:CVE-2026-47174 |
vulnerable | 2026-07-29 00:54:59.886106 |
Duck Site: Untrusted pull request code can trigger privileged production deployment
In Duck Site before version 1.0.1, the repository has a deploy workflow that runs after the build workflow completes. The build workflow runs on pull requests, while the deploy workflow runs with package-write permissions and deployment secrets. If an attacker can make a pull request build satisfy the deploy workflow’s main branch condition, the deploy job checks out the triggering workflow commit, builds it into a Docker image, pushes it as latest, and triggers Dokploy deployment. This can allow attacker-controlled pull request code to become the deployed production site image without being merged. This issue has been patched in version 1.0.1.
Published: 2026-06-11T18:46:59.572Z
Updated: 2026-06-11T19:47:33.704Z |
Imported from gcve-enriched-dumps CVE data |
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