@Agenticmail/Core
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cpe:2.3:a:agenticmail:@agenticmail/core:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
part: a version: * update: *
| Vendor | Agenticmail (b64a1e65-fff2-51c8-a34f-05a090b2c16f) |
|---|---|
| Product | @Agenticmail/Core (d1168513-8abc-54c5-89c2-86fe7682f8e1) |
| Edition | * |
| Language | * |
| Software edition | * |
| Target software | * |
| Target hardware | * |
| Other | * |
| Notes | Imported from gcve-enriched-dumps CVE data |
PURL mappings
| PURL | Source | Last updated |
|---|---|---|
| No PURL mappings for this CPE yet. | ||
Vulnerability references
| Identifier | cpeApplicability | Submitted | db.gcve.eu details | Rationale |
|---|---|---|---|---|
CVE:CVE-2026-57495 |
vulnerable | 2026-07-29 01:00:29.826936 |
AgenticMail: Unauthenticated inbound mail triggers bypassPermissions resume of the operator's Claude Code session (bridge-wake)
AgenticMail gives AI agents real email addresses and phone numbers. In @agenticmail/claudecode prior to version 0.2.39, @agenticmail/codex prior to version 0.1.33, @agenticmail/core prior to version 0.9.43, and @agenticmail/openclaw prior to version 0.5.71, two inbound-mail handlers act on a privileged effect without verifying that the sender is the operator, while a sibling handler in the same repo does. The higher-impact one: any external email routed to the bridge inbox causes the dispatcher to resume the operator's Claude Code session with `permissionMode: 'bypassPermissions'`, embedding the attacker-controlled `from`/`subject`/`preview` verbatim into the prompt the resumed agent reads — an indirect prompt injection into a fully-privileged agent (Bash/Write/Edit/WebFetch + the agenticmail MCP toolbelt) running as the operator's OAuth identity. The sibling operator-query email-reply hook gates the same untrusted-From provenance with `isOperatorReplySender(replyFrom, config.operatorEmail)` (fail-closed); the bridge-wake path — a strictly higher-privilege effect — has no equivalent. @agenticmail/claudecode 0.2.39, @agenticmail/codex 0.1.33, @agenticmail/core 0.9.43, and @agenticmail/openclaw 0.5.71 contain a fix.
Published: 2026-07-20T22:09:54.001Z
Updated: 2026-07-22T13:53:49.201Z |
Imported from gcve-enriched-dumps CVE data |
CVE:CVE-2026-47255 |
vulnerable | 2026-07-29 00:54:59.951256 |
AgenticMail API/storage and outbound relay hardening
HIGH (8.2)
AgenticMail gives AI agents real email addresses and phone numbers. @agenticmail/api prior to version 0.9.32 and @agenticmail/core prior to version 0.9.10 had weakness related to validation and and binding of inactive-agent hour filtering; storage SQL identifier validation; metadata-backed ownership checks for raw storage SQL; blocking direct storage metadata access through raw SQL; fail-closed outbound worker secret handling; SMTP envelope/header control-character validation before command construction; and TLS certificate verification as the default for MailSender with an explicit opt-out for local development. @agenticmail/api prior to version 0.9.32 and @agenticmail/core prior to version 0.9.10 are patched.
Published: 2026-07-20T21:56:40.252Z
Updated: 2026-07-21T14:06:27.159Z Reference links
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Imported from gcve-enriched-dumps CVE data |
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