Nebula Mesh
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cpe:2.3:a:juev:nebula-mesh:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*part: a version: * update: *
| Vendor | Juev (64fbf82d-ad35-5524-9389-ead2d645a4f4) |
|---|---|
| Product | Nebula Mesh (a9105b0e-e8da-5d47-9109-fcd7f7b5938d) |
| Edition | * |
| Language | * |
| Software edition | * |
| Target software | * |
| Target hardware | * |
| Other | * |
Notes
Imported from gcve-enriched-dumps CVE data
PURL mappings
| PURL | Source | Last updated |
|---|---|---|
| No PURL mappings for this CPE yet. | ||
Vulnerability references
| Identifier | cpeApplicability | Submitted | db.gcve.eu details | Rationale |
|---|---|---|---|---|
CVE:CVE-2026-47726 |
vulnerable | 2026-09-16 04:34:01.476266 |
nebula-mesh: GET /api/v1/audit-log discloses all entries to any operator
nebula-mesh is a self-hosted control plane for Slack Nebula mesh virtual private network. Prior to version 0.3.2, internal/api/audit.go:12 — handleGetAuditLog does no admin check. The route is bearer-auth gated only; any operator API key returns the full audit log via store.ListAuditEntries (up to limit=1000). This includes cross-tenant actor names, host/CA/operator IDs, action timestamps, and masked-IP entries from rate-limit refusals — enough surface for a tenant to enumerate the server's activity, infer staffing patterns, or identify high-value targets. This issue has been patched in version 0.3.2.
Published: 2026-07-28T17:58:27.219Z
Updated: 2026-07-28T18:43:23.969Z |
Imported from gcve-enriched-dumps CVE data |
CVE:CVE-2026-47768 |
vulnerable | 2026-09-16 04:34:01.191511 |
nebula-mesh: Newly-minted operator API key exposed in redirect URL (Referer, history, proxy logs)
MEDIUM (5.5)
nebula-mesh is a self-hosted control plane for Slack Nebula mesh virtual private network. Prior to version 0.3.2, newly-minted operator API key exposed in redirect URL (Referer, history, proxy logs). This issue has been patched in version 0.3.2.
Published: 2026-07-28T18:19:39.559Z
Updated: 2026-07-28T18:47:53.458Z |
Imported from gcve-enriched-dumps CVE data |
CVE:CVE-2026-47725 |
vulnerable | 2026-09-16 04:34:00.886629 |
nebula-mesh: Web UI lacks CSRF tokens on /ui/* mutating endpoints
nebula-mesh is a self-hosted control plane for Slack Nebula mesh virtual private network. Prior to version 0.3.3, every /ui/* POST / PUT / PATCH / DELETE route processes the request as soon as the session cookie validates. SameSite=Lax on the session cookie prevents most cross-site form submits but does not protect: top-level form-submit navigations from third-party pages (some browsers still send Lax cookies on top-level POSTs); same-registrable-domain attackers (sibling-subdomain XSS, subdomain takeover); the GET /ui/logout route, which a third-party <img src=".../ui/logout"> can force-trigger. This issue has been patched in version 0.3.3.
Published: 2026-07-28T17:56:29.651Z
Updated: 2026-07-28T19:36:36.348Z |
Imported from gcve-enriched-dumps CVE data |
CVE:CVE-2026-48058 |
vulnerable | 2026-09-16 04:33:05.116894 |
nebula-mesh: Session and OIDC state cookies lack the Secure attribute
nebula-mesh is a self-hosted control plane for Slack Nebula mesh virtual private network. Prior to version 0.3.2, internal/web/session.go and internal/web/oidc.go set HttpOnly and SameSite=Lax on every cookie but never Secure. A single plaintext request to the origin (operator on a LAN, mistyped URL, HTTP→HTTPS not strictly enforced, reverse proxy misconfiguration) discloses the session. This issue has been patched in version 0.3.2.
Published: 2026-07-28T18:47:57.916Z
Updated: 2026-07-28T19:16:39.082Z |
Imported from gcve-enriched-dumps CVE data |
CVE:CVE-2026-48025 |
vulnerable | 2026-09-16 04:33:04.563739 |
nebula-mesh: Decrypted CA private key persists in heap after signing
nebula-mesh is a self-hosted control plane for Slack Nebula mesh virtual private network. Prior to version 0.3.7, internal/pki/resolver.go:36-64 constructs a CAManager with the plaintext ed25519.PrivateKey after unwrapping via the master key; internal/pki/ca.go:13-16 stores it. Callers at internal/api/enroll.go:116, internal/api/updates.go:297, and internal/api/mobile_bundle.go:40 use the manager for one Sign() and drop the reference on function return — but the underlying slice contents are not wiped before release. The keystore package's contract (internal/keystore/keystore.go doc: "Callers MUST zeroise the returned plaintext DEK as soon as it is no longer needed") is not met by the CAManager consumer. Decrypted CA private keys persist in process heap until Go's GC scavenges the underlying slice — minutes to hours under load, indefinitely on idle servers. This issue has been patched in version 0.3.7.
Published: 2026-07-28T17:40:37.329Z
Updated: 2026-07-29T13:55:01.392Z |
Imported from gcve-enriched-dumps CVE data |
CVE:CVE-2026-49258 |
vulnerable | 2026-09-16 04:32:55.738625 | db.gcve.eu details were skipped to keep the page responsive. | Imported from gcve-enriched-dumps CVE data |
CVE:CVE-2026-47724 |
vulnerable | 2026-07-29 00:55:00.370465 | db.gcve.eu details were skipped to keep the page responsive. | Imported from gcve-enriched-dumps CVE data |
CVE:CVE-2026-47723 |
vulnerable | 2026-07-29 00:55:00.370203 | db.gcve.eu details were skipped to keep the page responsive. | Imported from gcve-enriched-dumps CVE data |
CVE:CVE-2026-47722 |
vulnerable | 2026-07-29 00:55:00.369996 | db.gcve.eu details were skipped to keep the page responsive. | Imported from gcve-enriched-dumps CVE data |
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