Eclipse Ankaios

In Eclipse Ankaios versions v0.5.1 through v1.0.1, the agent-side Control Interface authorizer incorrectly evaluates multi-segment allow rules whose first path segment is a wildcard. An authenticated workload with access restricted by such a rule can submit a CompleteStateRequest or UpdateStateRequest with an empty field mask. The request may then be incorrectly authorized as matching the scoped rule, allowing the workload to read the complete cluster state or replace state outside its authorized subtree. This may result in unauthorized disclosure or modification of other workloads and cluster configuration. Only a rule consisting solely of * is intended to authorize an empty mask. Mitigation: Until an update containing the fix is installed, avoid multi-segment Control Interface allow-rule filter masks that begin with a wildcard, such as *.workloads.some_workload. Replace them with explicit paths such as desiredState.workloads.some_workload, where applicable. A filter mask consisting solely of * has different, intentionally unrestricted semantics and should only be used when full-state access is intended.

Published: 2026-09-07T09:42:03.424Z
Updated: 2026-09-08T15:03:21.136Z

In Eclipse Ankaios versions 0.1.0 through 1.0.1, the agent does not limit the length declared by a workload in a length-delimited protobuf message received through the Control Interface FIFO. A workload granted Control Interface access can specify an excessive message length, causing an unbounded memory allocation that may abort the Ankaios agent process. This results in loss of orchestration services for workloads managed by the affected agent.

Published: 2026-09-07T10:01:07.356Z
Updated: 2026-09-08T15:06:08.932Z

In Eclipse Ankaios versions 0.1.0 through 1.0.2, the agent creates workload files and Control Interface named pipes (FIFOs) under a predictable path derived from the agent name and a hash of the workload's runtime configuration. If a directory or FIFO already exists at that path when the agent (re)starts, the agent reuses it based only on an existence and/or file-type check, without validating its owner or permissions. A local, unprivileged user with write access to the same base directory (by default under `$TMPDIR/ankaios`, e.g. shared `/tmp`) can pre-create this path hierarchy, including the two Control Interface FIFOs, before the agent starts. The agent then treats the attacker-owned FIFOs as the legitimate Control Interface for the targeted workload. The attacker can complete the Control Interface handshake and issue requests using that workload's configured `controlInterfaceAccess` permissions, allowing impersonation of the workload and, depending on its configured permissions, unauthorized reading and/or modification of the cluster's desired state.

Published: 2026-09-14T17:44:56.384Z
Updated: 2026-09-15T08:18:26.215Z