Android App

In versions of the Datadog Android application prior to v545-5.9.2, the app tags Crashlytics data with the user's Datadog UUID, with no user-facing opt-out. Impact: The Datadog user UUID and crash data are visible within Firebase Crashlytics. This UUID is not identifying outside Datadog's own systems.

Published: 2026-08-07T18:02:35.142Z
Updated: 2026-08-08T01:05:53.273Z

In versions of the Datadog Android application prior to v541-5.9.2, BubbleChatActivity is exported with no permission guard and accepts a SEND intent with a caller-supplied conversation_id. When the activity closes and no in-process session matches that ID, it unconditionally cancels notification ID 9201 (the Bits AI chat notification), with no check on the caller's identity or ownership of the conversation. This requires a malicious application co-installed on the victim's device. Impact: A co-installed application can silently dismiss the victim's Bits AI chat notification. No chat content is exposed; conversation data remains server-authentication gated and is never returned to the caller.

Published: 2026-08-07T18:02:34.957Z
Updated: 2026-08-08T01:05:53.248Z

In versions of the Datadog Android application prior to v541-5.9.2, the exported launcher activity AppActivity accepts an attacker-supplied session (including OAuth tokens) from Intent extras with no permission guard, and signs the app into that session without validating it against the backend. This requires a malicious application co-installed on a device with the Datadog app installed, and an OAuth token the attacker is willing to load into the victim's app. Impact: A co-installed application can switch the victim's Datadog app to a session the attacker controls. This is an account-confusion issue; it does not by itself expose the victim's existing session or data.

Published: 2026-08-07T18:02:35.043Z
Updated: 2026-08-08T01:05:53.203Z

In versions of the Datadog Android application prior to v554-5.9.4, two Room-backed SQLite databases store sensitive content in plaintext: LocalNotificationDatabase (notification title, message, recipient, service, tags, and on-call/incident deep links) and SearchRecentDatabase (the user's full in-app search history). Impact: Any actor able to bypass the app sandbox can read these databases in plaintext.

Published: 2026-08-07T18:02:34.902Z
Updated: 2026-08-08T01:05:53.195Z

In versions of the Datadog Android application prior to v545-5.9.2, six App Widget configuration activities (IncidentWidgetActivity, MonitorSavedViewWidgetActivity, OnCallShiftsWidgetActivity, OnCallPagesWidgetActivity, SloWidgetActivity, DashboardWidgetActivity) are exported with no permission guard. Each accepts a caller-supplied AppWidgetManager.EXTRA_APPWIDGET_ID and, when no deep-link destination is resolved, uses it to load the matching widget's stored session and automatically log in as that user. Because Android widget IDs are small sequential integers, a co-installed application can brute-force this value to find one that matches a widget configured on the victim's device. This requires: A malicious application co-installed on the victim's device. At least one of the six widgets configured on the victim's home screen. An active Datadog session cached locally. Impact: The matching configuration activity opens in the foreground under the victim's session and renders live infrastructure data. Exposure is limited to a visual side channel (e.g., screen recording or accessibility services); the calling application cannot programmatically read the rendered data.

Published: 2026-08-07T18:02:35.165Z
Updated: 2026-08-08T01:05:53.332Z