Redocly Cli
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cpe:2.3:a:redocly:redocly-cli:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
part: a version: * update: *
| Vendor | Redocly (591283be-c08e-56d0-9c41-6ccde038e2d4) |
|---|---|
| Product | Redocly Cli (81ac8bff-df72-59e3-8631-d7bf1980935c) |
| Edition | * |
| Language | * |
| Software edition | * |
| Target software | * |
| Target hardware | * |
| Other | * |
| Notes | Imported from gcve-enriched-dumps CVE data |
PURL mappings
| PURL | Source | Last updated |
|---|---|---|
| No PURL mappings for this CPE yet. | ||
Vulnerability references
| Identifier | cpeApplicability | Submitted | db.gcve.eu details | Rationale |
|---|---|---|---|---|
CVE:CVE-2026-63225 |
vulnerable | 2026-10-13 12:28:38.689229 |
Redocly CLI: Path traversal when using `split` command
MEDIUM (4.4)
Redocly CLI makes OpenAPI validation, linting, and documentation workflows easier. Prior to @redocly/cli 2.33.2, the split command constructs output paths under --outDir from untrusted OpenAPI or AsyncAPI component names and x-codeSamples lang values without verifying that the resolved target remains inside the selected directory. A description containing literal ../ traversal segments in those fields can cause the split command to place or overwrite files outside --outDir. Component data remains constrained to YAML or JSON, and code-sample filenames remain based on the HTTP method, so this is not an unrestricted arbitrary-content file write. This issue is fixed in @redocly/cli version 2.33.2.
Published: 2026-09-16T19:09:00.593Z
Updated: 2026-09-17T16:13:49.405Z Reference links
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Imported from gcve-enriched-dumps CVE data |
CVE:CVE-2026-63325 |
vulnerable | 2026-10-13 12:28:38.281428 |
Redocly CLI: Arbitrary code execution via Arazzo `$faker` expression using `respect`
HIGH (7.8)
Redocly CLI makes OpenAPI validation, linting, and documentation workflows easier. Prior to version 2.33.0 of @redocly/respect-core and @redocly/cli, the respect command dynamically evaluates $faker runtime expressions in Arazzo descriptions. A crafted expression can traverse constructor, prototype, or __proto__ properties in packages/respect-core/src/modules/context-parser/get-value-from-context.ts, reach the JavaScript Function constructor, and execute arbitrary code when a user processes an untrusted description. The executed code runs with the privileges of the CLI process and can execute shell commands or read CI secrets. Users processing only trusted, self-authored workflows are not affected. This issue is fixed in @redocly/respect-core and @redocly/cli version 2.33.0.
Published: 2026-09-16T19:07:44.847Z
Updated: 2026-09-18T18:23:39.395Z Reference links
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Imported from gcve-enriched-dumps CVE data |
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