Blazar

In OpenStack Blazar before 17.0.1, the V2 lease API does not enforce object-level authorization on its update and delete operations (PUT /v2/leases/{lease_id} and DELETE /v2/leases/{lease_id}). The policy authorize() wrapper attempts to load the target lease to build the authorization target from its owner, but it looks up the lease under the keyword "lease_id" whereas the controller methods name the parameter "id" (and the wsme_pecan.wsexpose wrapper delivers it positionally). The lookup returns None, and thus authorization falls back to the requesting user's own project_id/user_id instead of the target lease owner. Any authenticated user who knows a lease ID can therefore modify or delete leases belonging to other users and projects, bypassing the intended ownership check.

Published: 2026-09-18T18:57:56.107Z
Updated: 2026-09-22T15:19:34.210Z

In OpenStack Blazar before 17.0.1, the V2 lease listing operation (GET /v2/leases) returns leases for every project without enforcing project scoping or an administrator-only policy. Any authenticated user with access to the Blazar REST API can enumerate leases belonging to other tenants, exposing lease IDs, reservation IDs, resource IDs, and reservation metadata. The exposed lease IDs also enable the object-level authorization bypass tracked in the companion request, allowing an attacker to then modify or delete the enumerated leases.

Published: 2026-09-18T18:48:34.899Z
Updated: 2026-09-18T19:47:14.422Z