Eclipse Connected Services Platform
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cpe:2.3:a:eclipse_foundation:eclipse_connected_services_platform:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*part: a version: * update: *
| Vendor | Eclipse Foundation (2c315c48-0111-5572-bbde-cc70cfafb2e9) |
|---|---|
| Product | Eclipse Connected Services Platform (6d2d4073-87b3-54b7-8511-214cac972296) |
| Edition | * |
| Language | * |
| Software edition | * |
| Target software | * |
| Target hardware | * |
| Other | * |
Notes
Imported from gcve-enriched-dumps CVE data
PURL mappings
| PURL | Source | Last updated |
|---|---|---|
| No PURL mappings for this CPE yet. | ||
Vulnerability references
| Identifier | cpeApplicability | Submitted | db.gcve.eu details | Rationale |
|---|---|---|---|---|
CVE:CVE-2026-110726 |
vulnerable | 2026-11-03 10:16:01.513124 |
Details available
In `api-gateway` versions till `1.7.3`, The default rate-limit key resolver, `ClientIpKeyResolver`, derives the per-client bucket key from the leftmost element of the `X-Forwarded-For` request header. That element is supplied by the originating HTTP client and is not validated against any trusted-proxy list. A single attacker can therefore obtain an unlimited number of independent rate-limit buckets — one per unique header value — and completely bypass the gateway's request-rate limiting on every route that uses the shipped default configuration.
Published: 2026-10-15T11:58:03.903Z
Updated: 2026-10-15T15:30:14.212Z |
Imported from gcve-enriched-dumps CVE data |
CVE:CVE-2026-110723 |
vulnerable | 2026-11-03 10:16:01.072815 |
Details available
In `api-gateway` versions till `1.7.3`, The default rate-limit key resolver, `ClientIpKeyResolver`, derives the per-client bucket key from the leftmost element of the `X-Forwarded-For` request header. That element is supplied by the originating HTTP client and is not validated against any trusted-proxy list. A single attacker can therefore obtain an unlimited number of independent rate-limit buckets — one per unique header value — and completely bypass the gateway's request-rate limiting on every route that uses the shipped default configuration.
Published: 2026-10-15T12:14:08.140Z
Updated: 2026-10-15T13:11:12.574Z |
Imported from gcve-enriched-dumps CVE data |
CVE:CVE-2026-110724 |
vulnerable | 2026-11-03 10:16:00.470651 |
Details available
In `api-gateway` versions till `1.7.3`, The default rate-limit key resolver, `ClientIpKeyResolver`, derives the per-client bucket key from the leftmost element of the `X-Forwarded-For` request header. That element is supplied by the originating HTTP client and is not validated against any trusted-proxy list. A single attacker can therefore obtain an unlimited number of independent rate-limit buckets — one per unique header value — and completely bypass the gateway's request-rate limiting on every route that uses the shipped default configuration.
Published: 2026-10-15T12:11:22.470Z
Updated: 2026-10-16T18:43:57.741Z |
Imported from gcve-enriched-dumps CVE data |
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