ShapeShift KeepKey
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cpe:2.3:h:shapeshift:keepkey:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
part: h version: - update: *
| Vendor | Shapeshift (8952567a-243f-52b4-a5eb-ca24562b2bb0) |
|---|---|
| Product | Keepkey (3ab497ec-3a78-566f-85cc-486be75ec347) |
| Edition | * |
| Language | * |
| Software edition | * |
| Target software | * |
| Target hardware | * |
| Other | * |
| Notes | Imported from NVD CPE 2.0 feed |
PURL mappings
| PURL | Source | Last updated |
|---|---|---|
| No PURL mappings for this CPE yet. | ||
Vulnerability references
| Identifier | cpeApplicability | Submitted | db.gcve.eu details | Rationale |
|---|---|---|---|---|
CVE:CVE-2023-27892 |
not_vulnerable | 2026-06-08 05:57:42.424480 |
Details available
LOW (3.8)
Insufficient length checks in the ShapeShift KeepKey hardware wallet firmware before 7.7.0 allow a global buffer overflow via crafted messages. Flaws in cf_confirmExecTx() in ethereum_contracts.c can be used to reveal arbitrary microcontroller memory on the device screen or crash the device. With physical access to a PIN-unlocked device, attackers can extract the BIP39 mnemonic secret from the hardware wallet.
Published: 2023-05-02T00:00:00.000Z
Updated: 2025-01-30T16:42:38.016Z |
Imported from gcve-enriched-dumps CVE data |
CVE:CVE-2021-31616 |
not_vulnerable | 2026-06-08 05:31:53.777669 |
Details available
Insufficient length checks in the ShapeShift KeepKey hardware wallet firmware before 7.1.0 allow a stack buffer overflow via crafted messages. The overflow in ethereum_extractThorchainSwapData() in ethereum.c can circumvent stack protections and lead to code execution. The vulnerable interface is reachable remotely over WebUSB.
Published: 2021-05-06T11:01:42.000Z
Updated: 2024-08-03T23:03:33.671Z Reference links |
Imported from gcve-enriched-dumps CVE data |
CVE:CVE-2019-14355 |
not_vulnerable | 2026-06-08 05:12:54.610867 |
Details available
On ShapeShift KeepKey devices, a side channel for the row-based OLED display was found. The power consumption of each row-based display cycle depends on the number of illuminated pixels, allowing a partial recovery of display contents. For example, a hardware implant in the USB cable might be able to leverage this behavior to recover secret data shown on the display. In other words, the side channel is relevant only if the attacker has enough control over the device's USB connection to make power-consumption measurements at a time when secret data is displayed. The side channel is not relevant in other circumstances, such as a stolen device that is not currently displaying secret data. NOTE: the vendor's position is that there is "insignificant risk.
Published: 2019-08-10T15:41:57.000Z
Updated: 2024-08-05T00:12:43.567Z |
Imported from gcve-enriched-dumps CVE data |
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