Intel AC 8260 Firmware

Bluetooth LE and BR/EDR secure pairing in Bluetooth Core Specification 2.1 through 5.2 may permit a nearby man-in-the-middle attacker to identify the Passkey used during pairing (in the Passkey authentication procedure) by reflection of the public key and the authentication evidence of the initiating device, potentially permitting this attacker to complete authenticated pairing with the responding device using the correct Passkey for the pairing session. The attack methodology determines the Passkey value one bit at a time.

Published: 2021-05-24T17:22:16.000Z
Updated: 2025-11-04T19:12:18.753Z

Bluetooth legacy BR/EDR PIN code pairing in Bluetooth Core Specification 1.0B through 5.2 may permit an unauthenticated nearby device to spoof the BD_ADDR of the peer device to complete pairing without knowledge of the PIN.

Published: 2021-05-24T17:41:15.000Z
Updated: 2025-11-04T19:12:16.581Z

An issue was discovered in the ALFA Windows 10 driver 6.1316.1209 for AWUS036H. The WEP, WPA, WPA2, and WPA3 implementations accept plaintext frames in a protected Wi-Fi network. An adversary can abuse this to inject arbitrary data frames independent of the network configuration.

Published: 2021-05-11T19:34:42.000Z
Updated: 2026-04-14T08:49:03.263Z

An issue was discovered in the kernel in NetBSD 7.1. An Access Point (AP) forwards EAPOL frames to other clients even though the sender has not yet successfully authenticated to the AP. This might be abused in projected Wi-Fi networks to launch denial-of-service attacks against connected clients and makes it easier to exploit other vulnerabilities in connected clients.

Published: 2021-05-11T19:37:55.000Z
Updated: 2026-04-14T08:49:01.511Z

The 802.11 standard that underpins Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA, WPA2, and WPA3) and Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) doesn't require that the A-MSDU flag in the plaintext QoS header field is authenticated. Against devices that support receiving non-SSP A-MSDU frames (which is mandatory as part of 802.11n), an adversary can abuse this to inject arbitrary network packets.

Published: 2021-05-11T00:00:00.000Z
Updated: 2026-04-14T08:48:59.636Z

The 802.11 standard that underpins Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA, WPA2, and WPA3) and Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) doesn't require that all fragments of a frame are encrypted under the same key. An adversary can abuse this to decrypt selected fragments when another device sends fragmented frames and the WEP, CCMP, or GCMP encryption key is periodically renewed.

Published: 2021-05-11T00:00:00.000Z
Updated: 2024-08-04T15:19:08.605Z

Improper input validation for some Intel(R) Wireless Bluetooth(R) products may allow an authenticated user to potentially enable escalation of privilege via local access.

Published: 2020-08-13T03:29:13.000Z
Updated: 2024-08-04T06:02:52.337Z

Insufficient control flow management for some Intel(R) Wireless Bluetooth(R) products may allow an unprivileged user to potentially enable denial of service via adjacent access.

Published: 2020-08-13T03:29:54.000Z
Updated: 2024-08-05T00:19:41.418Z