ABB IRC5

An attacker who successfully exploited these vulnerabilities could cause the robot to stop, make the robot controller inaccessible. The vulnerability could potentially be exploited to perform unauthorized actions by an attacker. This vulnerability arises under specific condition when specially crafted message is processed by the system. Below are reported vulnerabilities in the Robot Ware versions. * IRC5- RobotWare 6 < 6.15.06 except 6.10.10, and 6.13.07 * OmniCore- RobotWare 7 < 7.14

Published: 2024-05-14T13:41:02.136Z
Updated: 2024-08-01T18:56:22.492Z

An attacker who successfully exploited these vulnerabilities could cause the robot to stop, make the robot controller inaccessible, or execute arbitrary code.  The vulnerability could potentially be exploited to perform unauthorized actions by an attacker. This vulnerability arises under specific condition when specially crafted message is processed by the system. Below are reported vulnerabilities in the Robot Ware versions. * IRC5- RobotWare 6 < 6.15.06 except 6.10.10, and 6.13.07 * OmniCore- RobotWare 7 < 7.14

Published: 2024-05-14T13:20:55.671Z
Updated: 2024-08-01T18:56:22.392Z

IRC5 exposes an ftp server (port 21). Upon attempting to gain access you are challenged with a request of username and password, however you can input whatever you like. As long as the field isn't empty it will be accepted.

Published: 2020-07-15T22:15:13.640Z
Updated: 2024-09-16T19:51:41.495Z

The IRC5 family with UAS service enabled comes by default with credentials that can be found on publicly available manuals. ABB considers this a well documented functionality that helps customer set up however, out of our research, we found multiple production systems running these exact default credentials and consider thereby this an exposure that should be mitigated. Moreover, future deployments should consider that these defaults should be forbidden (user should be forced to change them).

Published: 2020-07-15T22:15:17.666Z
Updated: 2024-09-16T23:46:37.980Z