Texas Instruments DYNAMIC MULTI-PROTOCAL MANAGER
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cpe:2.3:a:ti:dynamic_multi-protocal_manager:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
part: a version: - update: *
| Vendor | Ti (2c4e43a5-e08a-542d-a02a-38c51c91aad1) |
|---|---|
| Product | Dynamic Multi Protocal Manager (3df9f263-4281-5b91-9a2d-b5e990449f43) |
| Edition | * |
| Language | * |
| Software edition | * |
| Target software | * |
| Target hardware | * |
| Other | * |
| Notes | Imported from NVD CPE 2.0 feed |
PURL mappings
| PURL | Source | Last updated |
|---|---|---|
| No PURL mappings for this CPE yet. | ||
Vulnerability references
| Identifier | cpeApplicability | Submitted | db.gcve.eu details | Rationale |
|---|---|---|---|---|
CVE:CVE-2020-16630 |
vulnerable | 2026-06-03 14:41:47.755629 |
Details available
TI’s BLE stack caches and reuses the LTK’s property for a bonded mobile. A LTK can be an unauthenticated-and-no-MITM-protection key created by Just Works or an authenticated-and-MITM-protection key created by Passkey Entry, Numeric Comparison or OOB. Assume that a victim mobile uses secure pairing to pair with a victim BLE device based on TI chips and generate an authenticated-and-MITM-protection LTK. If a fake mobile with the victim mobile’s MAC address uses Just Works and pairs with the victim device, the generated LTK still has the property of authenticated-and-MITM-protection. Therefore, the fake mobile can access attributes with the authenticated read/write permission.
Published: 2021-09-20T19:20:50.000Z
Updated: 2024-08-04T13:45:33.225Z |
Imported from gcve-enriched-dumps CVE data |
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