Cisco Aironet 1852

A vulnerability in the authentication functionality of Cisco Wireless LAN Controller (WLC) Software could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to bypass authentication controls and log in to the device through the management interface This vulnerability is due to the improper implementation of the password validation algorithm. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by logging in to an affected device with crafted credentials. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to bypass authentication and log in to the device as an administrator. The attacker could obtain privileges that are the same level as an administrative user but it depends on the crafted credentials. Note: This vulnerability exists because of a non-default device configuration that must be present for it to be exploitable. For details about the vulnerable configuration, see the Vulnerable Products section of this advisory.

Published: 2022-04-15T14:15:50.948Z
Updated: 2024-11-06T16:26:54.535Z

An issue was discovered in the ALFA Windows 10 driver 6.1316.1209 for AWUS036H. The WEP, WPA, WPA2, and WPA3 implementations accept plaintext frames in a protected Wi-Fi network. An adversary can abuse this to inject arbitrary data frames independent of the network configuration.

Published: 2021-05-11T19:34:42.000Z
Updated: 2026-04-14T08:49:03.263Z

An issue was discovered in the kernel in NetBSD 7.1. An Access Point (AP) forwards EAPOL frames to other clients even though the sender has not yet successfully authenticated to the AP. This might be abused in projected Wi-Fi networks to launch denial-of-service attacks against connected clients and makes it easier to exploit other vulnerabilities in connected clients.

Published: 2021-05-11T19:37:55.000Z
Updated: 2026-04-14T08:49:01.511Z

The 802.11 standard that underpins Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA, WPA2, and WPA3) and Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) doesn't require that the A-MSDU flag in the plaintext QoS header field is authenticated. Against devices that support receiving non-SSP A-MSDU frames (which is mandatory as part of 802.11n), an adversary can abuse this to inject arbitrary network packets.

Published: 2021-05-11T00:00:00.000Z
Updated: 2026-04-14T08:48:59.636Z

The 802.11 standard that underpins Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA, WPA2, and WPA3) and Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) doesn't require that all fragments of a frame are encrypted under the same key. An adversary can abuse this to decrypt selected fragments when another device sends fragmented frames and the WEP, CCMP, or GCMP encryption key is periodically renewed.

Published: 2021-05-11T00:00:00.000Z
Updated: 2024-08-04T15:19:08.605Z